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Abstract
Over the past few years, networks which are subject to long delays, high disruptions, asymmetric 
data rates and/or low delivery ratio etc, have gained popularity. Different approaches have been 
researched in the past to improve performance of networks under these challenging conditions e.g. 
modifying TCP behaviour suitable for a selected set of networks including Performance Enhancing 
Proxies (PBPs) based satellite networks and by proposing complete new networking architecture 
such as Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN).
The presence of PBPs breaks the original end-to-end TCP connection into two or three TCP 
connections and in this way allows a TCP variant to be applied on satellite link in a suitable way. 
The presence of PBPs on satellite links has disadvantages, e.g. splitting TCP connection is not 
compliant with the standard internet security mechanism IPsec as IPsec encrypts the traffic which 
can be only viewed at end nodes. In the thesis, a new dynamic Multilayer IPsec (ML-Ipsec) 
protocol is proposed for TCP/IP based networks, which enables the trusted intermediate devices to 
access part of IP datagram in order to function properly, while maintaining confidentiality between 
end nodes. The protocol is also flexible enough to break the IP datagram as many as 15 levels.
The other paradigm, DTN, is an overlay networking architecture; evolved from a focus on deep 
space networks to a broader class of heterogeneous networks e.g. wireless adhoc networks etc. The 
security protocols defined for DTN, including the “Bundle Security Protocol” (BSP) are designed 
on the assumption that some sort of public key management mechanism is there to support security 
functions. In the DTN community, DTN key management is still an open issue. The thesis 
proposes to solve the key management issue by contributing: 1) A new Efficient Scalable Key 
Transport Scheme (BSKTS) which provides a way to transport the symmetric key using public key 
cryptography, in which the symmetric key generated at a DTN node can be transported to another 
communicating body securely along with the data. The BSKTS is scalable, communication 
efficient and compliant with the BSP semantics. 2) Sstandard PKI validation and revocation 
mechanism is enhanced by a new scheme which is compliant with PKI, compliant with BSP and 
also enables the applications to build a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) of reduced size. 
Furthermore the scheme also increases the efficiency to search through the list while providing 
communication efficiency to distribute CRL in the network due to its reduced size. 3) Framework 
for DTN key management architecture is proposed to establish a shared state between 
communicating parties dynamically. The shared state establishes the building block for security 
services; the cryptographic algorithms and the keys.
Keywords: Security, PBPs, Satellite Networks, Key Management, PKI, DTN, Key Transport.
Acknowledgments
First of all I thank Allah (SWT) and Holy Prophet, Hazrat Muhammad PBUH, with whose 
blessings I am able to finish my PhD thesis.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Haitham Cruickshank and Prof. Zhili Sun 
for their expert guidance and support. I am very grateful to them for giving me an opportunity 
to carry out an interesting research work in satellite network security and for their constant 
encouragement throughout my research.
I’m grateful to everyone in CCSR for all the help, especially DTN+ group members. Their 
useful and timely comments were instrumental in ensuring that my work progressed.
Finally I acknowledge my indebtedness to my Parents (Hafiz Mumtaz Hussain, Farzana 
Perveen) and all other family members including my wife and my daughter for their love, 
encouragement and support throughout my life.
I ll
Contents
Contents
Abstract...........................................................................................................................................ii
Acknowledgments.........................................................       iii
Contents........................................        iv
List of Abbreviations..................   x
List of Figures............................................................................. xii
List of Tables.................................................................................................   xv
1 Introduction  ....................................................................   1
1.1 Objectives..............................................................................................................  4
1.2 Thesis Contribution.................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Organization of the Thesis...............................   5
1.4 List of Selected Publications..........................................................................................   6
2 Security Architecture for IP Based Satellite Networks ...........................  8
2.1 Overview of Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs).......................................................10
2.2 Security impact on Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs)  ...................... ..............11
2.3 Overview of Standard IPsec.............................................................................  13
2.3.1 Securing Path(s) between IPsec Entities ................................................................ 14
2.3.1.1 Securing Path(s) Between Pair of Gateways................................   14
2.3.1.2 Securing Path(s) Between Pair of Hosts..............................................................14
2.3.1.3 Securing Path(s) Between Host and Gateway......................................................15
2.3.2 Security Goals.........................  15
2.3.3 IPsec Components...............................................   16
2.3.4 General Assumptions by IPsec..............   17
2.3.5 Security Association (SA)...................  17
2.3.6 Major IPsec Databases................................................................................................ 18
2.3.6.1 Security Policy Database (SPD)..........................................................................18
2.3.6.2 Security Association Database (SAD).................................................................18
2.3.6.3 Peer Authorization Database (PAD)....................................................................18
2.4 Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKE v2) Protocol and Its Role in IPsec......................19
IV
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ _______________________ Contents
2.4.1 IKEv2 Security Association’s Types...........................................................  19
2.4.2 Initial Exchanges (IKE_SA_INIT, IKE_AUTH)....................................................... 20
2.4.3 Create Child Exchange (CREATE_CHILD_SA)....................................................... 20
2.4.4 Informational Exchanges............................................  20
2.5 Security Protocols and Their Role in IPsec.....................   21
2.5.1 Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP)......................................................  21
2.5.1.1 Security Services Offered by ESP............. ........................................................21
2.5.1.2 ESP Header................................................................       22
2.5.2 Authentication Header (AH).................  24
2.5.2.1 Security Services Offered by AH.................. ......................................................24
2.5.2.2 AH Header........................................................................................................... 25
2.6 Limitations of IPsec....................................................................  26
2.6.1 Conflicts between IPsec and TCP PEP.............................................     26
2.6.2 Traffic Analysis...................................   27
2.6.3 Traffic Engineering .....................................................................................  27
2.6.4 Application Layer Proxies/Agents............................................................................. 27
2.7 Approaches to Resolve Conflicts between IPsec and Intermediate entities........................28
2.7.1 Replace IPsec with a Transport Layer Security Mechanism.......................................28
2.7.2 Tunnelling one security protocol with another..... .........    28
2.7.3 Using a Transport Friendly ESP Format..............................   29
2.7.4 Splitting IPsec into Two Segments.............................................   29
2.7.5 Multi-Layer IP Security Protocol (ML-IPSec)...............   29
2.8 Further Discussion................................   30
3 A New Dynamic Multi-Layer Security Architecture for Internet Protocol (ML- 
IPsec)..................  31
3.1 Zones  ...............................    31
3.2 Composite Security Association (CSA) .............  32
3.3 Protocol Headers ............................. 32
3.3.1 Authentication Header (AH) in ML-IPsec ................................................................ 32
3.3.2 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) in ML-IPsec.................................................. 33
3.4 Overview of ML-IPsec Functionality...............   34
3.4.1 Outbound and Inbound Processing in ML-IPsec........................................................ 34
3.4.1.1 Outbound Processing in ML-IPsec.......................................................................35
3.4.1.2 Inbound Processing in ML-IPsec..........................................................................36
3.4.1.3 Partial In-Out Processing at Intermediate Routers................................................36
________________________________________   Contents
3.5 New Dynamic ML-IPsec Protocol........................................... 37
3.5.1 Zones and Zone Map in Proposed Dynamic ML-IPsec...................................  37
3.5.2 Composite Security Association (CSA) in Proposed Dynamic ML-IPsec ......... 38
3.5.3 Security Protocol for Dynamic ML-IPsec......................... 38
3.5.3.1 ESP Header Design..  .....  38
3.5.3.2 ESP Header Processing........................................................................................39
3.5.4 Inbound, Outbound Processing...................    40
3.5.4.1 Outbound Processing in ML-IPsec  ...............................  40
3.5.4.2 Inbound Processing in ML-IPsec.......................................................  41
3.5.5 Proposed ML-IPsec Dynamic Behaviour Explained .............................................. 41
3.5.5.1 Dynamic ML-IPsec Working for 64Bytes Data Packet With 1 Zone................. 42
3.5.5.2 Dynamic ML-IPsec Working for 900 Bytes Data Packet With 2 Zones............ 43
3.5.6 Security Services Offered By New ML-IPsec Protocol.............................................44
3.5.7 Performance Evaluation of New Dynamic ML-IPsec Protocol.................................44
3.5.7.1 Experiment Environment.....................................................................................44
3.5.7.2 Traffic Models................................................................. 45
3.5.13 Policy Setup in SSF/SSFNet Databases..........................  45
3.5.7.4 Implementation of New ML-IPsec Protocol........................................................46
3.6 Limitations of Implementation..............................  53
3.7 Summary................        53
4 Security in Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) Based N etw orks................. 54
4.1 Characteristics of Challenged Networks  ................................................................ 55
4.2 Different Proposed DTN Architectures............................................................................55
4.3 Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN)  ....................................................56
4.3.1 DTN Motivating Applications.................................................................................... 56
4.3.1.1 Vehicular DTN Networks.................................................................................... 56
4.3.1.2 Lake Pollution Monitoring................................................................................... 58
4.3.1.3 Deep Space Missions .......................   58
4.3.1.4 Terrestrial Mobile Networks...................................  59
4.3.1.5 Sensor/Actuator Networks................................................................................... 59
4.3.2 DTN Overlay Architecture.......................................................    59
4.3.3 DTN Networking Issues............................................................................................. 61
4.3.4 Security for DTN Based Networks............................................................................. 62
4.3.4.1 Threat Analysis for DTN Networks..................................................................... 62
4.3.5 Secure Communication in DTN Networks................   63
VI
___________________________________________________ '   Contents
4.3.5.1 Hop-by-Hop Integrity and Authentication........................................................... 64
4.3.5.2 End-to-End Integrity and Authentication............................................................. 65
4.3.5.3 End-to-End Confidentiality  ..........................   66
4.3.6 Design Guidelines for Key Management..................      67
4.4 Further Discussion.............................................................................................................68
4.4.1 ONE Simulator................................................................................................   68
4.5 Summary  ......................................................................................................................68
5 An Efficient, Scalable Key Transport Scheme (ESKTS) for Delay/Disruption 
Tolerant Networks based on Public Key Cryptography........................................................ 70
5.1 Preliminaries..................................................................................................................... 71
5.1.1 Bundle Security and Challenges...............................................................   71
5.1.2 Proxy Signatures and Their Transfer without presence of Secure Channel.............. 72
5.1.3 Key Transport based on Public Key Cryptography....................................................73
5.2 Models....................................     73
5.2.1 Network Model  ...............................................................................................73
5.2.2 Adversary Model............................................................    73
5.2.3 Design Goals.............................................................................................   74
5.2.3.1 Security Goals.................................................................  74
5.2.3.2 Efficiency..................................................  74
5.3 Proposed Scheme....................................................................................   74
5.3.1 The ESKTS Scheme........................................  74
5.3.2 Design of Proposed Scheme ESKTS...........................................................................77
5.4 Evaluation of ESKTS............................................................    78
5.4.1 Security.........................    78
5.4.2 Compliance with Bundle Security Protocol..........................................................   79
5.4.3 Simulations and Performance Evaluation...................................................................80
5.4.3.1 Cryptographic Overhead Calculations........................... 80
5.4.3.2 Simulation.............................................................................  81
5.4.3.3 Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies.................................    83
5.4.3.4 Impact of Network Scalability..............................................................................85
5.5 Summary  .......  87
6 A Suitable PKI Validation and Revocation Method for D TN ............................................88
6.1 Preliminaries........................................................  89
6.1.1 Public Key Infrastructure  .......  89
VII
__________________________________________________   Contents
6.1.2 Certificate Revocation and Validation Mechanisms...........................     90
6.1.2.1 Certificate Revocation List.................................................................................. 90
6.1.2.2 Online Certificate Status Protocol........................................................................ 90
6.1.3 Hash Chain............................................................................................................... .91
6.1.4 NOVOMODO: Scalable Certificate Validation and Simplified PKI Management... 91
6.1.5 Heap, a Data Structure................................................................................................92
6.2 Design Goals.....................................................................................................................93
6.3 Proposed Scheme..............................................................................................................93
6.3.1 Network Model.....................................................   93
6.3.2 System Initialization...................................................     93
6.3.3 Certificate Validation and Revocation Method.......................................................... 94
6.3.3.1 CRL Generation and Distribution........................     94
6.3.3.2 CRL Design......................................................................................................... 95
6.4 Evaluation of Proposed Method...............   96
6.4.1 Complexity Analysis of Heap Based new CRL.........................................................96
6.4.2 Compliance with X.509 Public Key Infrastructure ...................................................97
6.4.3 Security...............   98
6.4.4 Simulations and Performance Evaluation...........................     99
6.4.4.1 Cryptographic Overhead Calculations........................   99
6.4.4.2 Simulations........................................................................................................ 100
6.5 Summary..........................   104
7 Framework for DTN Key Management Architecture................  105
7.1 Relationship between Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) and Proposed Key
Management Architecture and Framework..............    105
7.2 New Framework for DTN Key Management Architecture............................................. 107
7.2.1 Establishing Shared Secret....................................................................................... 108
7.2.1.1 Exchanging Keying Material............................................................................. 108
7.2.1.2 Negotiating Cipher suites between communicating Parties............................... 109
7.2.1.3 Security Policy Setup........................................................................................110
7.2.2 Informational Exchanges.........................................................................................110
7.3 Summary......................................................................................................................... 110
8 Conclusions......................................... 112
8.1 Main Findings.................................................................. 112
8.2 Future Work......................    114
Vlll
____________________________   Contents
References......................       115
Appendix A: Important Simulation Code....................................................  120
Code for Measuring Execution Tirne for Cryptographic Overhead................................. 120
Code for Adding Application to ONE Simulator like ESKTS or CRL....................................124
IX
List o f  abbreviations
List of Abbreviations
AH
BAB
BP
BSP
CA
CRL
CSA
DSA
DTN
DTNRG
ESKTS
ESP
ICV
IKE
IP
IPsec
IV
KDC
KPW
ML-IPsec
NIST
NOVOMODO
Authentication Header 
Bundle Authentication Block 
Bundle Protocol 
Bundle Security Protocol 
Certificate Authority 
Certificate Revocation List 
Composite Security Association
The acronym DSA stands for Digital Signature Algorithm 
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking 
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking Research Group 
Efficient, Scalable Key Transport Scheme 
Encapsulating Security Payload 
Integrity Check Value 
Internet Key Exchange 
Internet Protocol
Security Architecture for Internet Protocol
Initialization Vector
Key Distribution Centre
A proxy signatures technique
Multilayer Security Architecture for Internet Protocol
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Name of Scalable Certificate Validation and Simplified PKI 
Management Technique
NTP Network Translation Protocol
List o f abbreviations
OCSP Online Certificate Status checking Protocol
PAD Peer Authorization Database
PEP Performance Enhancing Proxy
PCB Payload Confidentiality Block
PIB Payload Integrity Block
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RAS Remote Access Solution
RFC Request For Comments
RSA A Digital Signatures Algorithm named on their inventors
(Rivest, Shamir, Adelman)
SA Security Association
SAD Security Association Database
SPD Security Policy Database
SPD-0 Security Policy Database -  Outbound
SPD-I Security Policy Database -  Inbound
SPD-S Security Policy Database -  Secure
SPI Security Parameter Index
SSF Scalable Simulation Framework
SSL Secure Socket Layer
SW Spray and Wait Protocol
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TFC Traffic Row Confidentiality
TLS Transport Layer Security
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Networks
XI
List o f Figures
List of Figures
Figure 2-1: Statistics for page source address [16].................................................................... 9
Figure 2-2: Statistics for requests from behind proxy servers [16]...........................................10
Figure 2-3: Security Solutions with PEPs........................................................................  13
Figure 2-4: Security Gateway to Security Gateway Tunnel.....................................................14
Figure 2-5: Endpoint-to-Endpoint Protection  ..............................................................15
Figure 2-6: Endpoint to Security Gateway Protection..............................................................15
Figure 2-7: ESP Header Format............................................................................................ i. 23
Figure 2-8: AH Header Format  ...................................................................................... 25
Figure 3-1: A Zone Map in ML-IPsec  ......................................................................... 32
Figure 3-2: ML-lPsec AH Header....................................................................     33
Figure 3-3: ML-IPsec ESP Header.................................................................  34
Figure 3-4: Example of Outbound ML-IPsec Processing.........................................................35
Figure 3-5: Example of Inbound Processing............................................................................ 36
Figure 3-6: Example of Partial In-Out Processing [8]....................................................  37
Figure 3-7: ESP Header for New ML-IPsec Protocol.............................................    39
Figure 3-8: Example of Outbound Processing......................................................................... 40
Figure 3-9: Example of Inbound Processing............................................................................ 41
Figure 3-10: ESP Header for Dynamic ML-IPsec with 1 Zone for IP datagram of 64 bytes data
......................................           42
Figure 3-11: ESP Header for Dynamic ML-EPsec with 1 Zone for IP datagram of 64 bytes data
.......................    ;.................... {...................  43
Figure 3-10: A sample of network configuration used for experiment.................  45
Figure 3-11: A sample of Policy Setup for Keys Lifetime.......................................................46
Figure 3-12: A sample of Policy Setup for Zone Wise Access Privileges  ...................... 46
Figure 3-13: A diagram showing the implementation model of NIST IPsec...........................48
Figure 3-14: Proposed Dynamic ML-IPsec implementation Model.........................................48
Figure 3-15: Packet statistics to show application on Security Policy on IPsec and ML-IPsec49
Table 3-16: Cryptographic Figures used for experiment..........................................................50
Table 3-17: Measurements for Network Throughput for file size of 5MBytes........................51
Figure 3-18: Network Throughput for file size of 5MBytes.................................................. 51
List o f Figures
Table 3-19: Measurements for Network Throughput for file size of 20MBytes.................... 52
Figure 3-20: Network Throughput for file size of 20MBytes................  52
Figure 4-1: Inter-process Communication using TCP/IP Protocol Stack................................ 54
Figure 4-2 An example of DTN VANETs......................................................................  58
Figure 4-3: DTN Nodes showing DTN Layers......................................................  59
Figure 4-4 Heterogeneous networks interconnected via DTN gateways using Bundle Protocol
....................................   64
Figure 4-5: A diagram showing provision of hop-by-hop integrity and authentication features
according to DTN security architecture........................................................................... 65
Figure 4-6 : A diagram showing provision of end-to-end integrity and authentication features
according to DTN security architecture........................................................................... 66
Figure 4-7 : A diagram showing provision of end-to-end confidentiality feature according to
DTN security architecture.......................................... ........................ ....................... 66
Figure 5-1: Design of ESKTS Scheme.................................................................................... 78
Figure 5-2: Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies: Deliver Ratio.......................................84
Figure 5-3: Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies: Overhead Ratio...  .................. 84
Figure 5-4: Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies: Average Latency.............................  85
Figure 5-5: Impact of Network Scalability: Delivery Ratio......................................................86
Figure 5-6: Impact of Network Scalability: Overhead Ratio............................ 86
Figure 5-7: Impact of Network Scalability: Average Latency..................................................87
Figure 6-1: An example of Min Heap...................................................   92
Figure 6-2: Original X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL)................................................95
Figure 6-3: Details of “Revoked Certificates” field from Original X.509 CRL  ............ 95
Figure 6-4: Design of New Certificate Revocation List (CRL)  ......................................96
Figure 6-5: Complexity Analysis of Heap based CRL..................................  97
Figure 6-6: Impact of CRL Size: Delivery Ratio.................................................   102
Figure 6-7: Impact of CRL Size: Overhead Ratio.....................................  103
Figure 6-8: Impact of CRL Size: Average Latency..... 103
Figure 7-1: Relationship between proposed Key Management Architecture and Bundle
Security Protocol.............................................................................................................106
Figure 7-2: Key Management Architecture and Framework: Components and their working
  108
Figure A-1: Definition of main Java method for Overhead Calculation program...................120
Figure A-2: Java program code to compute execution time to calculate Hash values 121
List o f  Figures
Figure A-3: Java program code to compute execution time to sign and verify digital signatures
using RSA................................................       121
Figure A-4: Java program code to compute execution time to sign and verify digital signatures
using DSA.................................    122
Figure A-5: Java program code to compute execution time to encrypt and decrypt data using
DSA....................................................  122
Figure A-6: Java program code to compute execution time to encrypt using AES-ECB...... 123
Figure A-6: Java program code to compute execution time to decrypt using AES-ECB 123
Figure A-8: Java program code to define Application class.................   124
Figure A-9: Java program code to show definition of Simulation parameters.......................125
Figure A-10: Java program code for Application Constructor definition and setting simulation
parameters of simulation configuration files...................................................................125
Figure A-11: Java program code for Application Constructor definition and setting simulation
parameters from the object of application.......................................................................126
Figure A-12: Java program code to show method for implementation of functionality of
Intermediate Nodes and Destination...............................................................................126
Figure A-13: Java program code to show method for implementation of functionality of
Source Nodes..................................................................................................................127
List o f  Tables
List of Tables
Table 2-1: Statistics for page source access [16]....................................................................... 9
Table 2-2: Statistics for requests from behind proxy servers [16].........  10
Table 5-1: Summary of notations for ESKTS...................................................... 75
Table 5-2: Summary of Specifications of Machine................................................................. 80
Table 5-3: Details of Execution Time of Cryptographic Operations....................................... 81
Table 5-4: Parameters for ESKTS Simulation......................................................................... 82
Table 6-1: Complexity Analysis of Heap Data Structure........................................................ 92
Table 6-2: Summary of Specifications of Machine................................................................. 99
Table 6-3: Details of Execution Time of Cryptographic Operations......................................100
Table 6-4: Parameters for new CRL based Revocation Mechanism Simulation....................101
Chapter 1 .'Introduction
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, networks which are subject to long delays, high disruptions, 
asymmetric data rates and/or low delivery ratio etc, have gained popularity. These networks 
including satellite, deep space communication, terrestrial mobile, military adhoc and 
sensor/actuator networks are termed as “Challenged Networks” due to their communication 
characteristics. Given the successful experience with large deployed TCP/IP compatible 
networks, it is natural to apply the concepts of TCP/IP networking to these challenged 
networks. However, the effects of significant link delays, non-existence of end-to-end 
communication paths, large memory and continuous power requirements and large 
bandwidth-delay products etc, present substantial operational and performance challenges to 
such approach. Different approaches have been researched in the past to improve performance 
of networks under these challenged conditions e.g. modifying TCP behaviour suitable for a 
selected set of networks including “Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) “ based satellite 
networks and by proposing complete new networking architecture such as Delay/Disruption 
Tolerant Networking (DTN) etc [1-5].
There are a variety of applications in the networking world today that require application 
intelligence at intermediate devices for their proper functioning e.g. satellite networks using 
PEPs, real time streaming applications like SIP, H.323 and peer-to-peer applications such as 
Napster, Net meeting etc. Similarly, to implement firewalls and Network Address Translation 
services, programs are embedded in the devices. In satellite networks usually PEPs are 
deployed on one or both sides of satellite link. The presence of PEPs breaks the original end- 
to-end TCP connection into two or three TCP connections and in this way allows TCP variant 
to be applied on satellite link in a suitable way. The presence of PEPs on satellite links 
violates the end-to-end semantics of transport protocols (like TCP) and have disadvantages, 
e.g. splitting TCP connection is not compliant with standard internet security mechanism 
IPsec [4].
Interworking between PEPs and security system has been researched in the past [7]. A variety 
of solutions have been proposed in the past to use secure communication in the presence of 
PEPs. Transport Friendly Encapsulating Security Payload (TF-ESP) proposes a modification 
to Encapsulating Security Payload header to accommodate the necessary TCP header 
information in the ESP header outside the scope of encryption. The mechanism proposes that
1
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the unencrypted TCP header information in ESP should be authenticated for integrity. 
Although this method addresses the performance issues, it exposes enough information to 
make the connection vulnerable to security threats. In addition to that, some other solutions 
also explore the use of transport layer security. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) as proposed by 
Netscape and later been standardized by IETF as Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a 
transport layer mechanism that provides data security. It encrypts the user data, but not the 
transport layer headers, such as TCP headers. Since the transport layer headers are in 
plaintext, the intermediate nodes (such as PEPs) can access or modify them; thereby the 
performance related issues can be resolved. However, it is not recommended to have TCP 
headers in plaintext due to security concerns. Suggestions were also made to use SSL/TLS 
with IPsec in order to protect the header information. The use of SSL/ TLS with IPsec is not a 
good solution because PEP cannot function as IPsec encrypts the TCP headers.
Another approach, to allow PEPs to function properly in presence of security solutions, is 
Multilayer IPsec. Multi-Layer IPsec (ML-IPsec) enhances the functionality of IPsec in order 
to solve the conflicts between IPsec and intermediate entities such as TCP and application 
layer PEPs. More information on Y. Zhang work about ML-IPsec can be obtained in [8], [9]. 
The earlier work on ML-IPsec done by HRL Laboratories was presented to IETF in many 
meetings and an internet-draft was written as well. IETF showed concern in three areas: 1) the 
idea presented by HRL Laboratories was only targeting very limited domain by fixing the 
zone map for the security association lifetime, 2) implementation complexity was increased 
and 3) it was required to show two more actual implementations of ML-IPsec. However, the 
problem of complexity of key management and security association setup for intermediate 
devices is also very complex and costly operation in terms of communication and it is not 
addressed very well. The HRL Laboratories suggested using “Internet Key Exchange (IKE 
v2)” for key setup. For large networks with large number of intermediate devices, using IKE 
v2 is not a good option. Also there are requirements for changing the databases of IPsec and 
IKE to make it compatible with ML-IPsec. This thesis describes a new ML-IPsec to resolve 
the issues of ML-IPsec proposed by Y.Zhang.
The other paradigm, DTN, is an overlay networking architecture; evolved from a focus on 
deep space networks to a broader class of heterogeneous networks e.g. wireless adhoc 
networks, wireless local area networks etc. These kind of networks may have the 
characteristics of long delays, asynchronous down and uplink latency and bandwidth, 
disruption, unexpected partitioning in the network etc. The growing interest in DTN based 
mobile adhoc networks (MANETS) including Vehicular networks and wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs) have spawned numerous conferences, journals, theses and commercial
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activities [5]. As defined by the Delay Tolerant Networking Research Group (DTNRG), the 
general concern of DTN is “How to address the architectural and protocol design principles 
arising from the need to provide interoperable communications with and among extreme and 
performance-challenging environments where continuous end-to-end connectivity cannot be 
assumed?” The challenge is to interconnect high heterogeneous networks together even if 
there is no end-to-end connectivity available always. Lots of efforts have been made to solve 
the networking issues in DTN, yet the security in DTN has not been paid much attention. Key 
Management in DTN is still considered to be an open issue.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is based on public key certificates and is most widely used 
mechanism for public key management. The security protocols defined for DTN including the 
“Bundle Security Protocol” (BSP) is designed on the assumption that some sort of public key 
management mechanism is there to support security functions. The currentBSP has provided a 
mechanism to prevent the unauthorized access and utilization of DTN resources and also 
maintains the end-to-end confidentiality and integrity by introducing different security blocks 
appended with actual payload. These security blocks are Bundle Authentication Block (BAB), 
Payload Integrity Block (PIB) and Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) to provide hop-by- 
hop integrity and authentication, end-to-end integrity and authentication and end-to-end 
confidentiality respectively. The provision of all these security features is dependent upon 
cryptographic keys where as BSP assumes presence of keys on all the intermediate and end 
nodes. However DTN characteristics, intermittent-connectivity, long delays and limited 
storage space at intermediate nodes, make the PKI unsuitable for DTN. In DTN community, 
DTN key management is still an open issue and PKI validation and revocation mechanism is 
considered as the root problem for suitability of PKI for DTN. We have proposed a new PKI 
validation and revocation mechanism suitable for DTN.
All phases of key management, like key generation, key exchange, key storage and rekeying 
etc, have different requirements for DTN but, providing a key exchange mechanism suitable 
for DTN environment is a big challenge. In DTN, malicious nodes (routers) can try to inject 
false bundles to spoil the network resources. This is a big threat for DTN due to resource 
scarcity. The current BSP has provided a mechanism to prevent the unauthorized access and 
utilization of DTN resources while also maintain the end-to-end confidentiality by introducing 
different security blocks appended with actual payload. As described earlier, these are BAB, 
PIB to provide hop-by-hop and end-to-end integrity and authentication and PCB to provide 
end-to-end confidentiality. The provision of all these security features is dependent upon 
cryptographic keys and BSP assumes presence of keys on all the intermediate and end nodes. 
As DTN “Store-and-forward” characteristics require the bundles to be stored at intermediate
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nodes, in case no communication link is present or in case of high disruption, bundles can be 
forwarded by these intermediate nodes. This “store-and-forward” characteristic of DTN also 
requires that key exchange mechanism should have fewer round trips. The traditional key 
exchange mechanisms are not suitable and do not scale well in DTN. Therefore such 
mechanism, in which key can be transported securely along with data, should be very suitable 
for DTN. The Efficient Scalable Key Transport Scheme (ESKTS) provides a way to transport 
the symmetric key generated at a DTN node to other communicating body securely along with 
the data. Because every time a key generated according to selected cipher suite, can be 
transported along with data, therefore it is communication efficient and well scalable. The use 
of symmetric key for encryption operations at end nodes also help to achieve the 
computational efficiency.
BSP provides end-to-end data confidentiality, data integrity and source authentication, hop- 
by-hop data integrity and source authentication, and access control in DTN network. Thè  ^
security aware communicating parties need to define some shared state between them. The 
shared state defines the security services that need to be provided to the bundle, the 
cryptographic algorithms to use to provide security services and the keys used to implement 
those cryptographic mechanisms. Establishing this shared state between communicating 
parties can be done manually but, it should not scale well. So we need a dynamic way to 
establish shared state that is still an open issue. We have proposed a key management 
architecture, which is considered a separate module which shall work together with BSP to 
provide a set of security services in DTN types of communication.
1.1 Objectives
As discussed above, the IPsec working is not compliant with working of PEPs, present in the 
satellite networks, and also key management for DTN is an open issue. This constitutes the 
main motivations for embarking on this research. More specifically the objectives of this 
thesis are as follows:
• To identify the issues in the design of IPSec and old ML-IPsec which are root cause in 
stopping the proper PEPs functioning in presence of security architecture.
• To develop a new less complex mechanism based on IPsec and old ML-IPsec which 
can resolve the conflict of proper functioning of PEPs in presence of security 
architecture.
• To identify the security threats and potential attacks for DTN based networks and 
specify main security requirements for DTN.
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• To identify main issues of key Management for DTN.
• To develop a secure and low overhead key management framework compliant with
BSP.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
The main contributions to the advancement of state-of-the-art are briefly summarized below:
1. A new dynamic ML-IPsec protocol is provided for TCP/IP based networks which 
enables the trusted intermediate devices to access part of IP datagram in order to 
function properly while maintaining confidentiality between end nodes. The new ML-
IPsec protocol applies security measures to IP datagram dynamically which is also
flexible enough to break down the IP datagram up to 15 levels depending upon the 
requirements.
2. A new ESKTS scheme provides a way to transport the symmetric key using public 
key cryptography. The symmetric key generated at a DTN node can be transported to 
other communicating body securely along with the data. The ESKTS is scalable, 
communication efficient and compliant with BSP semantics. Moreover, the use of 
symmetric key for encryption operations at end nodes also helps to achieve the 
computational efficiency.
3. Standard PKI validation and revocation mechanism is enhanced by a new scheme, 
which enables the CA to build Certificate Revocation List (CRL) of reduced size and 
it also provides a novel mechanism to verify the CA certificate locally by node. As 
there is no need to access online root CA who issued CA certificate so it does not 
require message exchanges to verify CA certificate. Furthermore it also increases the 
efficiency to search through the list while providing communication efficiency to 
distribute in the network due to its reduced size.
4. New key management architecture is proposed to establish a shared state between 
communicating parties dynamically. The shared state defines the security services; the 
cryptographic algorithms and the keys.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, the research background to 
Multilayer Security Architecture (ML-IPsec) is presented which includes survey of relevant 
literature. Chapter 3 presents the new dynamic ML-IPsec protocol in detail along with the 
evaluation of the protocol for selected security policy and network environment. In chapter 4 a
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research background to DTN key management problems is presented. Chapter 5 details the 
ESKTS transport scheme including the preliminaries for ESKTS scheme, ESKTS design and 
security and communication efficiency evaluation. Chapter 6 presents the mechanism to build 
a reduced sized and efficient Certificate Revocation List along with all the literature review, 
preliminaries details and evaluation of proposed scheme for selected network environment. 
Chapter 7 describes in detail the new key management architecture to establish a shared state 
between the communicating parties and finally chapter 8 concludes the work and setup future 
directions for research.
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IWSSC September 2009
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• Muhammad Nasir Mumtaz Bhutta, Haitham Cruickshank, John Ashworth, Martin 
Moseley, "Multilayer IPSec (ML-IPSec) Design for Transport and Application Layer 
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Satellite Systems (AIAA/ICSSC) 2010, Anaheim, California.
• Muhammad Nasir Mumtaz Bhutta, Haitham Cruickshank, John Ashworth, Martin 
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• M.Bhutta, H.Cruickshank, “An Efficient, Scalable Key Transport Scheme Based on 
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2 Security Architecture for IP Based 
Satellite Networks
Satellites have been successful in providing infrastructure for broadband telecommunications 
due to their wide area coverage and ability to speedily deploy new services especially in 
remote regions of the world. In general, the Internet transport protocol (namely TCP) exhibits 
suboptimal performance due to the following satellite characteristics [13, 2];
• Long feedback loops: Propagation delay from a sender to a receiver in a 
geosynchronous satellite network can range from 240 to 280 milliseconds. This will 
cause slow connection setup, slow to response to loss and slow discovery of available 
bandwidth.
• Large bandwidth*delay products: TCP needs to keep a large number of packets "in 
flight" in order to fully utilize the satellite link.
• Asymmetric capacity: The return link capacity for carrying ACKs can have a 
significant impact on TCP performance.
Also web caches are widely used today especially in satellite and wireless networks. Using 
cache servers can improve performance, by storing a copy of the accessed page in the server 
local memory and sending a cached copy of the requested page to the client instead of 
contacting the original server to retrieve the page. However and in order to function 
efficiently, the intermediate nodes (cache and proxy servers) need to access HTTP header. To 
show the impact of using cache for accessing the internet, some reports on network traffic 
from the Aggregate Internet Usage Statistics web site (www.statowl.com) 16] are presented in 
this section. The data is collected from information sent via web browsers. It is also worth 
noting that the presented statistics represent small percentage of all visited web sites. The data 
is made up of an average of 28 million unique visitors per month to the network of web sites 
that they collect data from.
As shown in Table 2-1 and figure 2-1, the report below compares search engine, direct, and 
referring site link visitor sources:
• Search Engine refers to visitors entering a site after running a query on a search 
engine.
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• Direct represents visitors that typed in the web site address into their browser
• Referring Site Link refers to visitors accessing a site via a link on a different site.
VISITOR TOTAL? I AUG * OCT  ^ NOV DEC , JAN  ^ FEB MAR I APR MAY
JULTOi SEP TO I . ; !
SOURCE ! AVG ! TO ' TO TO TO I T1 \ T1 : T1 i T1 T1
77.74% 180.77% , 81.14% i 80.13% 178.15% ; 77.45% 80.35% 177.19% 175.01% 75.19% , 75.82% 74.95%
Search 
Engine I
Direct 116.01% 12.09% 113.27%  ^14.31% 16.01% ' 16.30% « 13.57%  ^ 16.28% ! 18.56% ! 18.37% 18.04% , 18.38%
Referring | 
Site Link i
6.25% 7.14% : 5.59%  ^ 5.56% I 5.84% I 6.24% 6.07% I 6.53% I 6.43% ' 6.44% , 6.14% ' 6.67%
Table 2-1: Statistics for page source access [16]
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Figure 2-1: Statistics for page source address [16]
As shown in Table 2-2 and Figure 2-2 this report shows how the page is accessed with various 
network setups:
• The client browses the web site directly without using any proxy server.
• The client sends the request to proxy server and proxy server responds back with
the requested page (may be from its local cache or after retrieving from the actual 
server).
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B E H D m i  I I i I I i ! ' I
TOTAL I AUG I Î OCT I NOV I DEC | JAN I FEB I MAR I APR MAY
PROXY! IJUL’lOj iSEP'lO! i i I i  ^ i
! ! AVG I I '10 I ! '10 I '10 : 10 ' 11 I 11 i 11 1 11 ! 11 ia E R V E R l  I I I  j I  I I !  I I I I
i 89.30% i 90.40% I 89.68% 189.32% ' 89.27% ! 89.39% 189.56% i 89.30%  ^88.99% ' 88.66%  ^88.90% ' 89.06% iNo
Yes UO.70% 9.60% 10.32% |l0.68% U0.73% '10.61% ;i0.44% !l0.70% ill.01%  11.34%ill.lO% 10.94%
Table 2-2: Statistics for requests from behind proxy servers [16]
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Figure 2-2: Statistics for requests from behind proxy servers [16]
The above reports show that around 74% of network traffic reaches to its destination via 
search engines and is then redirected via its servers. The second report also shows that about 
11% of requests are from behind proxy servers already due to their network setup. Thus, the 
use of HTTP and TCP PEPs will have a great impact on the performance of the web caches. 
However end-to-end security conflicts with the use of these PEPs, or any other middle entities 
that require access to TCP, HTTP or other protocols header information.
2.1 Overview of Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs)
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) are widely used in satellite and wireless networks [14, 
15]. The PEP is an entity placed somewhere between the endpoints of a communication link. 
We focus on TCP PEPs (T-PEP) and Application PEPs (A-PEP). This approach can further 
be divided into two categories: Distributed PEPs where the PEP client and server are located 
at each end of the satellite link. The other category is Integrated PEPs with only one PEP 
entity residing with the satellite gateway.
10
Chapter 2: IPsec
Typical Transport layer PEP (T-PEP) improvements are:
• Connection Establishment Spoofing: Intelligently spoofs the TCP three-way 
handshake to speed up establishment of a connection.
• TCP Spoofing: Eliminates effects of satellite delay on TCP slow start and window 
sizing.
• ACK Reduction: Reduces unnecessary acknowledgements to improve bandwidth 
efficiency.
• Flow Control: Employs network feedback to intelligently control traffic flow.
• Error Recovery: Works closely with flow control to recover damaged or lost 
packets.
• Traffic Prioritization: Classifies traffic and uses cross layer techniques.
Typical application layer PEP (A-PEP) improvements are:
• HTTP pre-fetching: Intercepts requested Web pages, identifies Web objects
referred to by the Web pages, and downloads these objects in anticipation of the 
next user requests.
• Browser Cache Leveraging: Caches some web pages not residing in browser cache.
• Bulk Transfer Prioritization: Prioritizes bulk transfers depending on the type of 
data.
• Cookie Handling: Ensures accurate painting of Web pages with the proper cookies.
• DNS caching techniques: to further improve bandwidth utilization.
2.2 Security impact on Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs)
T-PEPs and A-PEPs require access to transport and HTTP headers. End-to-end security [6] 
such as IPsec and Transport layer Security TLS 17 may encrypt these headers and prevent the 
proper working of PEPs.
Interworking between PEPs and security system has been researched in the past [7]. One 
solution was the use of an intelligent switch at the PEP. As such, the PEP provides 
acceleration for the unencrypted packets, while the encrypted packets are allowed to bypass 
the PEP. With this approach, the applications can choose either security or performance but 
not both.
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Transport Friendly Encapsulating Security Payload (TF-ESP) or Modified ESP (M-ESP) 23] 
proposed a modification to IPsec ESP header to leave the TCP header information outside the 
scope of ESP encryption. It proposed that the unencrypted TCP header information in ESP 
should be authenticated for integrity. Although this method addresses the performance issues, 
it exposes enough information to make the connection vulnerable to security threats 18].
Some other solutions explore the use of transport layer security. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) as 
proposed by Netscape and later standardized by IETF as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [17] 
is a transport layer mechanism that provides data security. It encrypts the user data, but not the 
transport layer headers, such as TCP headers. Since the transport layer headers are in 
plaintext, the intermediate nodes (such as PEPs) can access or modify them; thereby the 
performance related issues can be resolved. However, it is not recommended to have TCP 
headers in plaintext due to security concerns [18]. Suggestions were also made to use 
SSL/TLS with IPsec in order to protect the header information. The use of SSL/ TLS with 
IPsec is not a good solution because PEP cannot function as IPsec encrypts the TCP headers.
In summary, there is a requirement that security must be implemented in such a way that 
allows PEP client and PEP server to access the transport protocol headers for T-PEPs and 
HTTP content for A-PEPs [19].
Let us analyse first the transport/application layer security (such as TLS). It will work 
seamlessly with T-PEPs because the TCP header is not encrypted by the security system. 
However, transport/application layer security will not function with A-PEPs. The reason is 
that application layer data will be encrypted by the security system. Hence, it will not be 
possible to perform techniques such as HTTP prefetching, caching and header and payload 
compressions.
Now let us focus on end-to-end network layer security (such as IPsec). This will encrypt the 
TCP header and user data which means that both T-PEPs and A-PEPs will not work. This in 
turn means that T-PEPs will not be able to perform techniques such as TCP spoofing, ACK 
reduction and flow control. In addition, A-PEPs will not be able to perform HTTP prefetching, 
caching and compression. Thus a user or network administrator must choose between using 
PEPs or using end-to-end IPsec. As shown in figure 2-3, PEPs can be used successfully with 
IPsec in tunnel mode between the satellite terminal and gateway. Here the encryption is 
performed on incoming traffic after the PEP operations and decryption is performed on 
outgoing traffic before the PEP operations. Of course, IPsec here is not end-to-end and its 
operations are under the control of the satellite network operator.
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Finally, let us examine the link layer security. As shown in figure 2-3, link layer security 
mechanisms such as DVB-RCS [20] security or Unidirectional Link Encapsulation (ULE) 
security 21] can be used. Here T-PEPs and A-PEPs will work seamlessly over the secure 
satellite link because encryption is performed at the link layer, where TCP and HTTP can be 
accessed in the clear by T- and A-PEPs. Although link layer security does not provide the 
desired end-to-end security, it is more efficient than using IPsec (in tunnel mode). It also can 
provide extra security functions that are not possible IPsec or upper layer security such as user 
identity hiding (such as IP and MAC addresses). This allows providing strong privacy service 
over the satellite broadcasting link.
The analysis above show the need to provide a new solution that preserves the user end-to-end 
security and allows PEPs access to TCP and HTTP headers. The solution is presented in the 
next chapter.
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Figure 2-3: Security Solutions with PEPs
2.3 Overview of Standard IPsec
The security architecture for the Internet Protocol (IP) is called IPsec and provides security at 
the IP network layer of the Internet protocol stack. This means that all IP packets can be 
protected, irrespective of the upper layer protocol being carried in the packet payloads, and 
that no re-engineering of applications is required in order to take advantage of the security 
provided by IPsec. The security provided by IPsec can also be made transparent to end users. 
For these reasons, IPsec forms the basis of many Virtual Private Networking (VPN) solutions,
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where it is used to provide security for communications over an untrusted network such as the 
Internet. IPsec has also been used by many vendors to build Remote Access Solutions (RAS), 
allowing organizations to control the access of roaming users to internal networks and hosts. 
IPsec operates in two modes, Tunnel and Transport mode. Tunnel mode encrypts the whole IP 
datagram and after that a new IP header is attached whereas in transport mode IP datagram 
except header is encrypted [6].
2.3.1 Securing Path(s) between IPsec Entities
2.3.1.1 Securing Path(s) Between Pair of Gateways
As shown in figure 2-4, none of the end nodes need to implement IPsec. The security services 
are provided by the gateways present at the protected subnets. This service is provided by 
tunnel mode because the outer IP header provides the source and destination addresses (of the 
security gateways), while the encrypted IP packet contains the original source and destination 
addresses. The destination security gateway after validating security services forward the 
packet to destination end host [6].
Protected Subnet Un Protected Subnet IPSec Tunnel
Protected Subnet
Tunnel Endpoint 
Gateway
Tunnel Endpoint 
Gateway
Figure 2-4; Security Gateway to Security Gateway Tunnel
2.3.1.2 Securing Path(s) Between Pair of Hosts
As shown in figure 2-5, end hosts have to implement the IPsec. This service usually runs in 
transport mode. Even, if tunnel mode service is used, the inner header in the encrypted IP 
packet will contain the same IP addresses as outer IP header [6].
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Protected Endpoint
Un Protected Subnet 
IPSec Tunnel OR 
Transport mode
Protected Endpoint
Figure 2-5: Endpoint-to-Endpoint Protection
2.3.1.3 Securing Path(s) Between Host and Gateway
As shown in figure 2-6, end host and gateways at different ends, need to implement the IPsec. 
This service works in tunnel mode usually to take the benefits of tunnel mode to hide the 
external characteristics of communication [6].
Un Protected Subnet 
IPSec Tunnel
Protected Subnet 
AND/OR
l n + a r r » a +
Protected Endpoint Protected Endpoint
Figure 2-6: Endpoint to Security Gateway Protection
Note: Important to note that IPsec does not impact the routing of encrypted packets.
2.3.2 Security Goals
IPsec is designed to provide high quality, cryptographic security services. The security
services included are given below [6]:
• Access Control is a security service to prevent unauthorized access to resources. For 
a host, resources can be its CPU cycles and data and for a gateway the resource is the 
network bandwidth behind gateway.
• Connectionless Integrity is a service to check any modification in the datagram 
without caring about the order in which datagram are received.
• Origin Authentication is a service to identify claimed source of data. This service is 
usually combined with sequence integrity.
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• Partial Sequence Integrity is a service to check the replay attacks or to check the 
duplicate packets arrivals.
• Data Confidentiality is security service to protect against the disclosure of data to 
unauthorized entities.
• Limited Traffic Flow Confidentiality is a service to protect the external 
characteristics of communication. It hides the source and destination address, message 
length or frequency of communication.
2.3.3 IPsec Components
IPsec uses combinations of security protocols, cryptographic algorithms, security policies and 
key management protocols to provide the security services presented in section 2.3.1. These 
different components are described below [6]:
• Security Protocols
o Authentication Header (AH) - provides origin authentication and 
connectionless integrity with optional provision of sequence integrity service 
(anti-replay service), 
o Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) - provides same security services as 
provided by AH but with extra optional provision of confidentiality. It is not 
recommended to use ESP for only provision of confidentiality but also 
integrity and authentication services should also be used. When operating in 
data confidentiality enabled mode, it also provides limited traffic flow 
confidentiality.
• Cryptographic Algorithms
Various cryptographic algorithms are required to achieve the integrity and encryption. 
Some cryptographic algorithms are mandatory to support functionality in 
heterogeneous environment while other algorithms are optional.
• Key Management
Most of the security services provided by IPsec require the use of cryptographic keys 
so IPsec has its own mechanisms to setup these keys among communicating parties. It 
includes both manual and automated key management. The IPsec key management 
protocol is called the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2).
• Security Policies
Security policies help in specifying the user access and control levels. The policy may 
include required levels of security services and the recommended security algorithms.
16
Chapter 2: IPsec
2.3.4 General Assumptions by IPsec
For the working of above described components to achieve the offered security services, 
there are some assumptions which need to be met [6]:
1. The security services offered by IPsec protocols and assisted cryptographic 
mechanisms are designed to provide high quality. But, the high quality of services is 
dependent upon the implementation of IPsec.
2. The security offered by computer systems is influenced by many factors such as 
personal, physical, procedural and computer security policies. Thus IPsec is just a 
part of that overall security system.
3. It also depends upon the operating system as well on which IPsec is running e.g. poor 
OS security; poor quality of random number sources etc. can degrade the security 
services offered by IPsec.
IPsec does not address issues described in the above assumptions. Thus, it is assumed that 
above factors are in place to get the high quality security services by IPsec.
2.3.5 Security Association (SA)
A security association (SA) is a one way traffic connection (“Simplex Connection”) which 
provides security services to the traffic passing through that connection. For a bi-directional 
communication two security associations need to be established.
The concept of SA is fundamental to IPsec as, the services offered by IPsec are actually 
provided via SA. SA is established between communicating parties by Internet Key Exchange 
v2 (IKEv2) protocol (RFC 4306). After establishment, the SA uses AH or ESP to provide 
security services like authentication, integrity and confidentiality.
There are two modes of Security Associations, Tunnel Mode SA (SA which is applied to an IP 
tunnel along with access control applied to the IP header inside the tunnel); and Transport 
mode SA (SA which is typically applied between hosts or security gateways to provide end- 
to-end security services). A host must support both transport mode and tunnel mode 
implementations of SAs and security gateways must support tunnel mode and may provide 
support for transport mode of SAs.
The functionality of SA is affected by the selection of security protocol, the SA mode, the 
endpoints of SA and the chosen optional services..
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2.3.6 Major IPsec Databases
There are three main databases in IPsec model that work together to achieve the desired 
security services functionality: the security policy database (SPD), the security association 
database (SAD) and the peer authorization database (PAD). SPD specifies the level of security 
services, (whether traffic will bypass IPsec protection or IPsec regulations will apply etc) 
required for the IP traffic. SAD contains the parameters that are associated with each 
established (keyed) SA while PAD provides a link between SA management protocol (like 
IKEv2) and SPD. This section does not describe the internal structure of the database but it is 
limited to describing the purpose of each database. More design details can be found in [6].
2.3.6.1 Security Policy Database (SPD)
SPD specifies what security policy rules are to be applied and in what fashion to IP datagrams. 
IPsec must consult SPD for all traffic processing (data traffic, IPsec management traffic, 
traffic not protected by IPsec etc.).
All IPsec implementations support at least one SPD and may support multiple. If multiple 
SPD are used then a function to select the appropriate SPD must be specified.
SPD is logically divided into three parts. SPD-Secure (SPD-S) contain rules for all IPsec 
protected traffic, SPD-Outbound (SPD-0) contains rules for all outbound traffic that needs to 
be bypassed or discarded and SPD-Inbound (SPD-I) specifies the rules for all inbound traffic 
that will be discarded or bypassed.
2.3.6.2 Security Association Database (SAD)
The security association database in IPsec contains entries for SAs. Each SA has an entry in 
the SAD. For outbound processing the entries in the SAD are pointed by the SPD-S part and 
for the inbound processing SAs are pointed by the Security Parameter Index (SPI).
2 3.6.3 Peer Authorization Database (PAD)
The Peer Authorization Database (PAD) provides the link between the SPD and security 
association protocols like IKE. The functionalities controlled by PAD are as follows:
• It identifies the authorized peers to communicate with the selected entity.
• It specifies the method and protocol used to authenticate each peer.
• It provides the authentication data for each pair.
• It contains the peer gateway location info such as. IP address, DNS name etc.
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• It constrains the values of IDs and types which can be asserted by a peer with 
regard to child SA creation.
The next sections describe the IKEv2, ESP, AH functionalities in details and they show how 
these protocols help to achieve the security goals defined by IPsec.
2.4 Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKE v2) Protocol and Its Role 
in IPsec
IPsec provides security services by maintaining shared state between the source and 
destination of an IP datagram. The state description includes specific information on the 
security service provided to the IP datagram, cryptographic algorithms and keys as input to 
these algorithms. IKEv2 helps in establishing this shared state.
IKEv2 performs mutual authentication between communicating parties and establishes a 
security association (SA) between them which contains the shared secret information. The 
following subsections focus on IKEv2 role in establishing SA and shared secret information 
by describing the functions of its components. This section does not specify the design or 
implementation specific header details of IKE. Those details can be found in RFC 4306 [22].
2.4.1 IKEv2 Security Association’s Types
IKEv2 exchanges are combination of request and response messages. It always consists of a 
request followed by a response. It is the duty of initiator to ensure the reliability, if the 
response is not received within a timeout then either must be response is sent again or 
connection is refused.
There are several kinds of exchanges IKEv2 perfomis in order to establish the SA. There are 
initial exchanges, IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH followed by CREATE_CHILD and 
informational exchanges. The first exchange (IKE_INIT) negotiates the security parameters 
for IKE_SA, sends nonces and sends Diffie-Hellman values. The second exchange 
(IKE_AUTH) sends the identities, proves knowledge of secret information to identities 
followed by setting first SA for AH or ESP. The subsequent exchanges include CREATE_SA 
exchange to create a child SA and information exchange which may delete SA, report error 
and may perform other housekeeping functions [22].
The following sections describe the above described exchanges and SA setup in detail.
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2.4.2 Initial Exchanges (IKE_SA_INIT, IKE_AUTH)
The IKEv2 communication always begins with IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges. 
These exchanges are usually consisting of 4 messages and in some cases the number may 
increase.
The IKE_INIT negotiates cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces and perform Diffie- 
Hellman exchanges. The initiator presents the cryptographic suite (cryptographic algorithms) 
and responder selects the supported algorithms. In this exchange keys are also setup which can 
be used for cryptographic operations in later exchanges.
The second request/response pair is always IKE_AUTH exchange which authenticates the 
previous messages, exchange identities and certificates and establishes the first CHILD_SA. 
This second and subsequent exchanges are encrypted and integrity protected with the Keys 
established in the first exchanges. In this way, these request responses are saved from
eavesdropping, are authenticated and integrity is validated [22].
2.4.3 Create Child Exchange (CREATE_CHILD_SA)
This exchange consists of a single request/response pair and was referred to as a phase2 in the 
older version of IKE (IKEvl). These exchanges are cryptographically protected. These 
exchanges are encrypted and integrity protected with the Keys established in the first 
exchanges. In this way, these request/responses are saved from eavesdropping, are 
authenticated and integrity is validated. Any participants can initiate the create child exchange 
after finishing the initial exchanges. So the initiator in these exchanges is that who sends the 
request for CREATE_CHILD_SA.
CREATE_CHILD_SA is created by sending a request which is used in AH or ESP. The 
keying material for these SA’s exchanges is used from the initial SA exchanges and keys are
calculated from the nonces sent during initial exchanges [22].
2.4.4 Informational Exchanges
During the secure exchanges, communicating parties may want to exchange control 
information like control messages or notifications of events. For this purpose the 
communicating parties perform informational exchanges. The exchanges are performed after 
the initial exchanges and SA is set up via CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges.
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Messages in the informational exchanges contain one or more notifications of delete or 
configuration of payload. The request of information exchange must be responded by a 
response otherwise the initiator will re-transmit the request.
The information exchange may not contain any payload and can use these exchanges only to 
ensure to each other that they are alive.
The SAs for ESP and AH always exist in pairs with one SA in each direction. When an SA is 
closed then all pairs of SA must be closed. If the SA is nested in case of tunnel mode 
operation then all connections must be deleted. To delete the SA, an informational exchange 
with the delete request is sent and then each end node can delete the SA. This implies that the 
SA establishment (before using IPsec with ESP or AH) will require duplex (two way) 
communications. After the SA establishment, IPsec can be used with simplex communications 
transported using UDP.
This section has shown how IKEv2 helps in establishing security associations. Once security 
associations are established then they use different security protocols to achieve the security 
goals (such as data encryption and integrity). The subsequent sections describe the role of 
security protocols in achieving these security goals [22].
2.5 Security Protocols and Their Role in IPsec
Security Protocols helps to achieve mix security services. IPsec is a modular architecture and 
any compliant security protocols can be selected. The two specified protocols which work 
with IPsec are Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) [23, 
24].
2.5.1 Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP)
ESP provides confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, anti-replay 
service and limited traffic flow confidentiality security services. This section focuses on 
describing how ESP achieves the security goals described above and shows the header fields 
which help in achieving described security goals. This section does not specify the design or 
implementation details for ESP but, those details can be seen in RFC 4303 [24].
2.5.1.1 Security Services Offered by ESP
There are three types of confidentiality and integrity services offered by ESP as described 
below [24]:
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• Confidentiality Only (may be supported)
• Integrity Only (must be supported)
• Confidentiality and Integrity (must be supported)
Confidentiality ESP provides confidentiality via encryption. It can be combined with 
integrity and authentication features or can be provided alone as a feature. The selection 
of encryption schemes is performed via SA. ESP also allows encryption-only SAs because 
it provides better performance while maintaining adequate level of security. These 
protocols use various encryption algorithms.
Data origin authentication and connectionless integrity are combined provided as integrity 
on per-packet basis. The connectionless integrity and origin authentication is provided 
indirectly as a result of binding the key with the origin (assuming the key is not 
compromised).
The integrity service can also be offered alone by ESP and must be supported in the 
implementation of ESP and also must be negotiable in SA management protocols (like 
IKEv2).
The anti-replav service is to detect the duplicates packet arrival. It is used to provide the 
sequence integrity and may be supported in the ESP implementation. The anti-replay service 
may be selected for an SA only if the integrity is selected for that SA. All the packets which 
are against IPsec security services are dropped (discarded).
It is provided by hiding the source and destination addresses. So, this service is employed 
usually in tunnel mode between security gateways. The “Traffic Flow Confidentiality” (TEC) 
mechanisms provide facilities of efficient generation, padding and discarding of dummy 
traffic.
2.5.1.2 ESP Header
As shown in figure 2-7, the fields present in the ESP header help in achieving the security 
goals. The detailed format of ESP header and description of is fields are described below [24].
• Security Parameter Index (SPI)
SPI is a 32 bit arbitrary value used by receivers to identify the SA to which an incoming 
packet is bound. SPI can be described on its own or in conjunction with protocol type (e.g. 
ESP). It is generated by receiver and set during negotiation process. So whether it uses 
combination of SPI value with addresses or it is alone, is a local matter to receivers.
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SPI identifies SA, so each entry in SAD database must describe whether SA is identified using 
source and/or destination addresses or not. The logical ordering of searching the SAD is as 
follows:
0 15 31 Bits
Security Parameter Index (SPI)
Sequence Number
Payload Data (Variable)
Payload Data
Padding
Padding (0 -  255 bytes)
Pad Length Next Header
Integrity Check Value (Variable)
Figure 2-7: ESP Header Format
1- Try to match SPI, source and destination addresses. If matched then process the 
incoming packet accordingly, otherwise go to step 2.
2- Try to match SPI, destination address. If matched then process the incoming packet 
according to entry else go to step 3.
3- Try to match SPI only. If there is a match then process the packet accordingly else 
discard the packet.
• Sequence Number
The 32-bit sequence number field is a counter which is incremented with every packet sent for 
a specific SA. This is a mandatory field and must be incremented for every packet sent in an 
SA, even when no anti-replay security service is selected. This number for source and 
destination sequence number field is set to “Zero” when new SA is established. This number 
should not be repeated. So, new SA should be developed and source, destination sequence 
numbers should be initialized before sending the 2^32"  ^packet.
• Payload Data
This variable field contains the data. This mandatory field is an integral multiple of bytes. If 
an encryption algorithm requires initialization vector (IV) then this is included as part of this 
field.
• Padding
Padding is to append zeros in order to achieve a required length. There are many reasons for 
padding to be used e.g. encryption algorithm may require some fixed number of plain text
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bytes to be input to the algorithm, irrespective of encryption algorithm padding may be used 
to ensure some specific length of cipher text and padding may be used for traffic flow hiding.
• Pad Length
This mandatory field indicates the number of padding bytes preceding it. The minimum value 
0 indicates no padding and maximum value is 255.
• Next Header
This 8 bits field identifies the type of payload after authentication header e.g. 4 identifies 
IPv4, 41 identify IPv6 and 6 indicate TCP.
• Integrity Check Value (ICV)
This variable length field contains the “Integrity Check Value” for this packet and is optional 
field. It is only included if the integrity service is selected for ESP. Implicit ESP trailer fields 
are included in the ICV computation. The integrity algorithms must specify the rules for 
computing ICV, comparison rules and steps for validation.
2.5.2 Authentication Header (AH)
AH provides data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and anti-replay security 
services. This section focuses on describing how AH achieves the security goals described 
above and shows the header fields which help in achieving above described security goals. 
This section does not specify the design or implementation details for AH but, those details 
can be seen in RFC 4302 [23].
2.5.2.1 Security Services Offered by AH
AH provides integrity related services only. It includes connectionless integrity and data 
origin authentication, hence referred as “Integrity”. The optional service anti-replay is 
selected when SA is negotiated.
AH provides integrity and indirectly authentication for IP header and next layer protocol 
data as well. There may be some changes in the IP header during the transit. The value of 
those fields (some times are called mutable fields such TTL and header checksums) may not 
be predictable by sender when packet arrives at receiver side. Such values can not be 
protected by AH.
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AH can be applied alone or in combination with ESP or in nested fashion depending upon the 
topology of the network. AH can be used to provide above described security services 
between security gateways, host to host and a security gateway and a host.
2,52,2 AH Header
As shown in figure 2-12, the fields present in the AH header help in achieving the security 
goals. The detailed format of AH header and description of is fields are described below [23].
0 15 31 Bits
Next Header Payload Length Reserved
Security Parameter Index (SPI)
Sequence Number Field
Integrity Check Value (ICV) [Variable]
Figure 2-8: AH Header Format
• Next Header
This 8 bits field identifies the type of payload after authentication header e.g. 4 identifies 
IPv4, 41 identify IPv6 and 6 indicate TCP.
• Payload Length
This 8 bits field specifies the length of Authentication Header (AH) in 32 bits (4 byte unit 
minus 2).
• Reserved
This 16 bits field is reserved for future use. The sender must set this field to “Zero” and 
receiver must ignore this field.
• Security Parameter Index (SPI)
SPI is a 32 bit arbitrary value used by receivers to identify SA to which incoming packet is 
bound. SPI can be described on its own or in conjunction with protocol type (e.g. AH). It is 
generated by receiver and set during negotiation process. So whether it uses combination of 
SPI value with addresses or it is alone, is a local matter to receivers.
SPI identifies SA, so each entry in SAD database must describe whether SA is identified using 
source and/or destination addresses or not. The logical ordering of searching the SAD is as 
follows:
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1- Try to match SPI, source and destination addresses. If matched then process the 
incoming packet accordingly, otherwise go to step 2.
2- Try to match SPI, destination address. If matched then process the incoming packet 
according to entry else go to step 3.
3- Try to match SPI only. If there is a match then process the packet accordingly else 
discard the packet.
• Sequence Number
The 32-bit sequence number field is a counter which is incremented with every packet sent for 
a specific SA. This is a mandatory field and must be incremented for every packet sent for a 
SA, even when no anti-replay security service is selected. This number for source and 
destination sequence number field is set to “Zero” when new SA is established. This number 
should not be repeated. So, new SA should be developed and source, destination sequence 
numbers should be initialized before sending the 2^32”^  packet.
• Integrity Check Value (ICV)
This variable length field contains the “Integrity Check Value” for this packet and must be 
integral multiple of 32 bits for IPV4 or IPv6. If the generated value is not integral multiple of 
32 then this field is padded to ensure that field is of required length. The padding length and 
integrity check values are calculated by different algorithms.
2.6 Limitations of IPsec
IPsec is a standard widely used for traditional Internet to provide security services and it is a 
success. With advancement in wireless technology, new satellite based wireless networks and 
adhoc wireless networks are emerging. The characteristics of such wireless networks are very 
different from traditional wired Internet especially in terms of delays and high loss rate in such 
environments.
However, this protection model and its strict layering principles are unsuitable for emerging 
class of new networking services and applications. This section describes some cases to 
highlight IPsec limitations for end-to-end security with the focus on satellite based networks 
8, 9].
2.6.1 Conflicts between IPsec and TCP PEP
Unfortunately, end-to-end IPsec conflicts with TCP PEP. TCP PEP operates on two pieces of 
state information stored in the headers of a TCP packet. They are TCP flow identification and 
sequence numbers within the flow. TCP flow identification is used to segregate TCP sessions
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for each TCP packet. It consists of source and destination IP addresses (both stored in IP 
header), as well as source and destination port numbers (both stored in TCP header). The 
sequence numbers are used to match acknowledgments with the data segments. This number 
is stored in TCP header. Without these two pieces of information, TCP PEP will not function.
When a TCP session is transported by an IPsec ESP protocol, the TCP header is encrypted 
inside the ESP header. It is, thus, impossible for an intermediate gateway outside sender or 
receiver’s security enclaves to analyze an IPsec header to extract TCP flow identification and 
sequence number. This will, inevitably, break the TCP PEP mechanisms. The PEP agent 
cannot obtain the information needed to generate acknowledgments or to retransmit data 
segments.
2.6.2 Traffic Analysis
Legitimate network engineers and administrators often need the ability to monitor and analyze 
traffic from a network to perform a variety of tasks like load/traffic control, capacity planning, 
diagnosis, intrusion detections, and firewalls. These tasks often require the ability to access 
upper-layer protocol headers within packets, while the IPsec encryption can prevent such 
analysis, or limit its granularity (for example, individual nodes or flows are inseparable in a 
IPsec tunnel between two gateways).
2.6.3 Traffic Engineering
Flow classification is essential in providing rich classes of services and quality-of-service 
(QoS) support. These include Random Early Detection (RED) and router-based congestion 
control and policing, integrated services (intserv, with resource reservation protocol (RSVP) 
and differentiated services (diffserv) and Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)).
The flow information in IPv4 is encoded in both the IP header and the upper-layer protocol 
headers, such as TCP or UDP port numbers. Therefore, any mechanism that discriminates 
between flows inside the network (generally called flow classification) will need to access the 
upper-layer protocol headers. If this is done inside the network (as opposite to classification at 
end-points) it may potentially conflict with IPsec.
2.6.4 Application Layer Proxies/Agents
An intermediate router can act as a transparent web proxy and it can entertain the requests 
from its local cache. For this operation, they need to parse the TCP and HTTP header of a
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passing IP datagram and serve it with the web page from local cache. It is transparent to end- 
users but boosts the responsiveness to requests.
2.7 Approaches to Resolve Conflicts between IPsec and 
Intermediate entities
Several approaches have been studied to resolve the conflicts between IPsec and intermediate 
entities that require access to transport and application data [8, 9].
2.7.1 Replace IPsec with a Transport Layer Security Mechanism
This approach is to use a transport-layer security mechanism as an alternative to IPsec to 
provide security services. The transport-layer mechanisni, such as secure sockets layer (SSL) 
or transport layer security (TLS), operates above TCP and works well with TCP PEP: it 
encrypts the TCP data while leaving the TCP header in unencrypted and unauthenticated form 
so that intermediate nodes can make use of the TCP state information encoded in the TCP 
header. However, this approach has some shortcomings which are described below:
• The presence of an encrypted TCP header exposes much vulnerability for attacks e.g. 
traffic analysis and also privacy concerns are there as sender and receiver identity 
information will be available.
• SSL/TLS only works on TCP but not on UDP (because of the reliability required for 
the key exchanges) so the range of applications is limited [8,9].
2.7.2 Tunnelling one security protocol with another
This approach tries to use transport layer security protocols, SSL/TLS, inside IPsec. In this 
way, SSL/TLS will protect the TCP data and IPsec will protect TCP header information. But, 
IPsec encrypts the whole TCP information including header and data part. So there will be 
short comings as well which are described below [8, 9]:
• Because TCP data will be encrypted twice by SSL/TLS and IPsec, so it will give rise 
to wastage of resource by encryption/decryption and authentication two times.
• TCP header information availability problem will also still exist.
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2.7.3 Using a Transport Friendly ESP Format
In this approach, the ESP protocol format was modified to make it friendly with transport 
layer by not encrypting TCP header . However, there are shortcomings in this approach as 
well which are described below [8, 9]:
• This approach works fine with some TCP PEP mechanisms like TCP snooping (store 
the packets locally and retransmit fast when required) but, it does not work well with 
TCP spoofing (terminate TCP connection locally and tailor the TCP protocol to 
communicate with remote machines for long delays) where a write access is needed to 
place the premature acknowledgements information. If this information is put outside 
the authentication scope without integrity protection then this can be dangerous.
• Further, the availability of unencrypted TCP state information to the world make to 
vulnerable to possible attacks such as traffic analysis and access to user/host private 
information.
• This approach also does not support upper layer protocols. Thus show very limited 
applications range.
2.7.4 Splitting IPsec into Two Segments
In this approach the IPsec protection can be applied twice, one time between sender and 
security gateway and other time between security gateway and destination (satellite). The 
shortcomings of this approach are that it will expose the information to intermediate nodes 
while confidentiality is only meant for end-to-end [8, 9].
2.7.5 Multi-Layer IP Security Protocol (ML-IPSec)
The idea of this approach is to break the IP datagram into different parts and apply different 
security mechanisms on different parts e.g. one security mechanism for transport header and 
different security mechanism for application data and these security mechanisms are meant for 
different nodes in the network. This approach allows the intermediate nodes to co-exist with 
IPsec.
However ML-IPSec has some issues, like limited application scope as zone map is fixed for 
life time of SA, which are addressed by [26, 64].
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2.8 Further Discussion
The next chapter discusses the new dynamic multi-layer IP security protocol in detail and then 
a critical analysis and evaluation of proposed approach is presented.
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3 A New Dynamic Multi-Layer Security 
Architecture for Internet Protocol 
(ML-IPsec)
Multi-Layer IPsec (ML-IPsec) enhances the functionality of IPsec in order to solve the 
conflicts between IPsec and intermediate entites such as TCP PEPs. Multi-Layer IPsec 
provides security services as IPsec does taking into consideration the following requirements:
• ML-IPsec should be as compatible as possible with original IPsec in format and 
software processing.
• ML-IPsec should be based on the data structures and building blocks used in IPsec so 
that it can be easily added to the IPsec implementation.
Before discussing the functionality of ML-IPsec, there are some concepts besides those 
described in IPsec which need to be understood. These concepts are discussed below:
3.1 Zones
The IP datagram is divided into portions. A portion under the same security protection scheme 
is called a “Zone”. The zones do not overlap. As an example, usually the portion of IP 
datagram that contains TCP header is zone 1 and the TCP data portion is zone 2.
A zone is not required to be a continuous block of IP datagram rather than it can consist of 
disconnected blocks within IP datagram. Each disconnected block in a zone is called “Sub­
zone”.
The zones are defined in terms of octets. A zone map is a mapping relationship from octets of 
the IP datagram to the associated zones for each octet. The zone boundaries must remain fixed 
for the lifetime of a security association otherwise it will be very difficult to do zone by zone 
decryption and authentication. Figure 3-1 shows an example of zone map [8, 9]. The Figure 3- 
1 shows that 1 to 20 bytes of IP header make sub zone of zone 1, 21 to 40 bytes of TCP header 
make zone 2, 41 to (41 + m) bytes of HTTP header make zone 3 in which m is length of 
HTTP header in bytes and ((42 + m) -  (42 + m + n)) bytes make another sub zone of zone 1.
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Bytes
IP Datagram
IP
Header
TCP
Header
HTTP
Header
Data
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 1
" ' " i l " (41 1 +n)
Figure 3-1; A Zone Map in ML-IPsec
3.2 Composite Security Association (CSA)
As security association (SA) defines the relationship between sender and receiver, the 
composite security association also includes the intermediate trusted nodes in the sender and 
receiver relationship. For each zone, there is an individual security association. Thus all 
security associations for all zones collectively form a composite security association (CSA) to 
cover the entire IP datagram.
A CSA has two elements. The first element is a zone map and second element is a zone list. 
The zone map shows the coverage of each zone in IP datagram and the zone list describes the 
list of SAs for each zone [8, 9].
The parameters of security associations in IPsec and ML-IPsec are identical except for some 
fields related to zones. That design details of parameters are not discussed here.
3.3 Protocol Headers
The same security protocols AH and ESP are used for ML-IPsec for both transport and tunnel 
mode with some modifications in some fields of the header. Following section describes the 
headers of AH and ESP.
3.3.1 Authentication Header (AH) in ML-IPsec
As shown in figure 3-2, the Authentication Header (AH) header is almost same as that used in 
IPsec. Some fields have been changed. This section discusses only the modified fields. The 
only change in ML-IPsec AH is authentication data section. In ML-IPsec, the data section of 
AH is further subdivided into zones. The authentication data field contains the integrity check 
values, ICVs, for the packet and is of variable size. The size is dependent on the payload
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length calculated from the ICVs for different zones which is dependent on the algorithm being 
used.
Nest Header Payload Length Reserved
Security Parameter Index (SPI)
Sequence Number
Authentication Data for Zone 1 (variable length)
Authentication Data for Zone 2 (variable length)
Figure 3-2: ML-IPsec AH Header
3.3.2 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) in ML-IPsec
As shown in figure 3-3, the ESP header is same as IPsec ESP with some amendments. The
ESP payload data field in ML-IPsec is divided into multiple pieces depending upon the 
number of zones. The payload data for each zone along with padding, padding length and next 
header field collectively is referred to as cipher text block of the zone. In ML-IPsec ESP is 
used in more useful manners where different IP datagram parts can be encrypted using 
different keys for different SAs for different zones.
The ESP authentication data field is variable in length and contains multiple ICVs which are 
calculated for different zones and the size of them is dependent on the algorithms being used 
for integrity.
After examining the different components of the ML-IPsec besides the standard IPsec 
components, the next section provides overview of the functionality of ML-IPsec and then 
some processing details of ML-IPsec are presented.
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Security Parameters Index (SPI)
Sequence Number
Encrypted Payload Data for Zone 1 (variable length)
Padding (0 -  255 bytes) Pad Length Next Header
Encrypted Payload Data for Zone 1 (variable length)
Padding (0 -  255 bytes) Pad Length
Authentication Data for zone 1 (variable Legnth)
Figure 3-3: ML-IPsec ESP Header
3.4 Overview of ML-IPsec Functionality
In ML-IPsec to apply the protection to IP datagrams, the IP datagrams are divided into zones. 
This is different from IPsec where protection mechanism is applied on whole IP datagram at 
once. Each zone has its own set of SAs, keys and access control rules (security policy rules).
To protect the traffic from source to destination, first the IP datagram is rearranged into zones 
and then cryptographic protections are applied. While encrypted datagram flows through the 
network, some authorized intermediate entities can decrypt and/or modify the datagram 
certain parts and is then encrypted again. For example, TCP header and TCP data parts are 
encrypted separately. The TCP data part can only be decrypted by the destination while TCP 
header part can be decrypted by some intermediate authorized entities (gateways). This way 
the functionality of ML-IPsec helps PEPs to function properly by accessing the desired 
information from TCP header [8, 9].
3.4.1 Outbound and Inbound Processing in ML-IPsec
To show the outbound and inbound processing of an IP datagram, a two-zone example is 
presented with IPsec security gateways at different ends. The outbound and inbound 
processing can be referred as processing at sender end and receiver end respectively [8, 9].
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3.4.1.1 Outbound Processing in ML-IPsec
The outbound processing is illustrated in figure 3-4.
Outbound: IP datagram
i  ----
Zone map 
-----
Plain Text (masked and concatenated)
Encryption (using ESP)
SA
Cipher Text (ESP)
A H
Authentication
ICV
AH or ESP authentication data
ESP paylod data
Figure 3-4: Example of Outbound ML-IPsec Processing
• ICV Calculation and Verification
The AH ICV calculation in ML-IPsec is different from the traditional IPsec. In ML-IPsec, 
for the designated zones the ICV is computed over following fields:
o IP header immutable fields, 
o AH header.
o All octets in designated zones.
For all non-designated zones, the ICV is calculated only over the octets of the zone.
The verification of ICV on inbound processing is also done on zone by zone basis. The 
verification is performed only if the SA is not null for that zone.
• Zone-by-Zone Encryption
For outbound processing the packets pass from following stages of processing in packet 
encryption.
o Zone-Wise Encapsulation
For each zone, the octets of all zones are first concatenated and then encapsulated 
into the ESP payload data field for the corresponding zone.
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o Padding
Depending on the encryption algorithm block size, the payload of each zone is 
padded to meet the block size requirement.
o Encryption
The resultant payload of above operations is then encrypted according the key, the 
encryption algorithm and algorithm mode as indicated by zonal SA.
3.4.1.2 Inbound Processing in ML-IPsec
The inbound processing in ML-IPsec is reverse of the outbound processing. The processing 
steps for inbound processing are shown in figure 3-5:
Outbound: IP datagram
A H
SA
.y  Decryption (using ESP)
Cipher Text (ESP)
ICV
ESP paylod data
Zone map
Plain Text (masked and concatenated)
Authentication
AH or ESP authentication data
Figure 3-5: Example of Inbound Processing
3.4.1.3 Partial In-Out Processing at Intermediate Routers
In an intermediate node (gateway or routers), a packet will go through partial inbound and 
then partial outbound processing. The steps of inbound and outbound processing remain same 
as described above. If the packet is modified during partial inbound processing then outbound 
processing must redo the authentication and/or encryption for that zone and also should 
replace the ICVs with new before forwarding to the next hop. An example of partial in-out 
processing is shown in figure 3-6.
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Figure 3-6: Example of Partial In-Out Processing [8]
3.5 New Dynamic ML-IPsec Protocol
The proposed new dynamic ML-IPsec protocol increases the application support by allowing 
breaking down the IP datagram into zones as per requirement. Before describing the details of 
new ML-IPsec protocol we summaries the design considerations here. We propose that zone 
map should not be part of CSA; instead the zone information is embedded in the ESP header. 
CSA will remain same except the zone map information. CSA will contain the zone list and 
all designated and non-designated security association parameters will also remain as part of 
CSA and will be described in the same way. The zone information about the IP datagram will 
go as part of ESP.
The inbound, outbound processing on participating nodes, ESP and AH packets parsing and 
security processing on ESP and AH are affected by making zone information part of ESP and 
AH header. This section only focuses on ESP but, the basic logic and processing with respect 
to zones will be same for AH as well. All these processing procedures and design details are 
described in this section.
3.5.1 Zones and Zone Map in Proposed Dynamic ML-IPsec
A zone in new ML-IPsec is a continuous block (portion) of IP datagram. The reason for
identifying a zone as a continuous block is due to the fact that it reduces the complexity to
process a part of IP datagram. The detailed discussion on zone manipulations is in the coming
sub-section. Security Protocols, where we discuss all the processing details.
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A  zone map in original ML-IPsec was described as bit-by-bit mapping of IP datagram into 
zones. However, in new ML-IPsec protocol zone map not only consists of zone information 
but it is also combinations. A zone pointer points to the starting bit location in ESP header 
when IP datagram is encapsulated after encryption. Further details about zone map are 
described in sub-section 3.5.3 along with parsing and processing details of ESP header and IP 
datagram.
3.5.2 Composite Security Association (CSA) in Proposed Dynamic ML- 
IPsec
CSA in original ML-IPsec consists of two elements, zone list and zone map. Zone list is a list 
of all security associations associated with each zone and zone map defines the IP datagram 
bits associated with each zone. However, CSA only consists of zone list without zone map as 
zone map information becomes part of ESP header. Apart from this change, CSA remains 
unchanged including the definitions of designated and non-designated parameters.
3.5.3 Security Protocol for Dynamic ML-IPsec
As described in section 3.6, the focus is only to discuss security protocols with respect to ESP.
The figure 3-7 shows the new ESP header. The ESP header is also the same as IPsec and 
original ML-IPsec ESP header with some changes.
3.5.3.1 ESP Header Design
The ESP header contains SPI and sequence number as in IPsec and original ML-IPsec. After 
the sequence number field, the ESP header contains a 4 bit field called “Total Zones”. This 
field identifies the total number of zones of each IP datagram under process. The IP datagram 
can be broken into as many zones as required by application of up to a maximum of 15 zones.
After “Total Zones” field, there are variable numbers of pointers fields depending upon the 
number of zones Each pointer field comprises of 11 bits to support the transmission of 1400 
bytes IP datagram including IP and TCP headers and points to the starting position of each 
zone inside ESP payload. After adding all the pointer fields, the necessary padding is done to 
keep ESP header word size constant of 32 bits. The 5 bits field “Pad Length” field describes 
the total number of padding bits being added in the ESP header for pointers.
The ESP payload data in new ML-IPsec protocol consists of multiple pieces depending upon 
the number zones. The data in each zone is encrypted after adding any necessary padding and 
then ICV is calculated on the resultant cipher data for that zone. The cipher data and ICV for a
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specific zone is combined and put in the ESP payload data at specific position. The resultant 
encrypted data and ICV of different zones are encapsulated in the ESP payload to make it 
consistent with IP datagram data.
The figure 3-7 shows the new ESP header for n number of zones.
Security Par a hi é të f  I fid ex  (SPI)
Sequence Nurnber
Total Zones 
(4bits)
Pointer to starting 
position of Zone (n) 
(11 bits)
Pointer to 
Starting position 
of Zone 1 
(11 bits)
Padding
Pointer to Starting 
Position of Zone 2 
(11 bits)
Pad Length
Encrypted Payload data for Zone 1 
(including padding, pad length, next header). 
(Variable Length)
integrity Check Value (ICV) for Zone 1
Figure 3-7: ESP Header for New ML-IPsec Protocol
3.S.3.2 ESP Header Processing
The ESP header processing at participating nodes is consistent with original ML-IPsec and 
IPsec protocols. The processing steps described here are followed in outbound and inbound 
processing performed in participating entities in the communication. The processing steps are 
as follows:
• For encryption, the payload data part for each zone is appended with necessary 
padding and pad length depending on the algorithm and then is encrypted. However, 
the designated zone also contains the “Next Header” field as in original ML-IPsec. 
For decryption operation, the decryption is done depending on the algorithm selected 
and original data is received after truncating the padding and pad length fields. The
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operation steps performed for encryption/decryption are consistent with IPsec and 
ML-IPsec.
• The ICV calculation steps in new ML-IPsec are same as in IPsec and original ML- 
IPsec depending upon the selected algorithm. However, the way ICV for each zone is 
encapsulated in ESP header is different from original ML-IPsec. In original ML-IPsec 
ICVs for all zones were combined together and then appended at the end of combined 
encrypted data of all zones but, in new ML-IPsec ICV for each zone is appended at 
the end of encrypted data for that specific zone to make it easy for processing and less 
complex. As ICV is always calculated to fixed size depending upon the algorithm 
selected, it can be easily extracted from the end of zone encrypted data at receiving 
end to verify the integrity.
3.5.4 Inbound, Outbound Processing
The outbound and inbound processing can be referred as processing at sender end and receiver 
end respectively. In intermediate nodes, partial processing is done on the IP datagram 
accessible part; however the steps remain same with respect to inbound and outbound 
processing.
3.5.4.1 Outbound Processing in ML-IPsec
In new ML-IPsec protocol the outbound processing is done in the same way as described in 
section 3.5.1 with the following exceptions:
Putboun d : I P Data g ram
Zonewlse Encryption (using ESP) along 
with zones location information
Security
Association
(SA) Cipher data (ESP)
l e v  Authentication Data
ESP Payload Data
Figure 3-8: Example of Outbound Processing
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There is no pre-defined constant zone map which is consulted to perform security 
operations on each selected zone. The zones are generated dynamically and are 
processed for encryption and integrity check value computation. However, the 
sequence of performing security operations remains unchanged.
The processing steps for outbound processing are shown in figure 3-8.
3.S.4.2 Inbound Processing in ML-IPsec
The inbound processing in ML-IPsec is reverse of the outbound processing. The processing 
steps for inbound processing are shown in 3-9:
Security
Association
Cipher data (ESP)
Zonewise Encryption (using ESP) along 
with zones location înfotrnatjon
ESP Payload Data
ic y  Authentication Data
IP patagram
Figure 3-9: Example of Inbound Processing
3.5.5 Proposed ML-IPsec Dynamic Behaviour Explained
To demonstrate the dynamic behaviour of proposed ML-IPsec, some examples are presented 
here. These examples explain how to process the IP datagram according to ML-IPsec rules. 
For demonstration of the working of ML-IPsec, we select two different IP datagrams of 
different sizes and also break them into different number of zones.
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3.5.5.1 Dynamic ML-IPsec Working for 64Bytes Data Packet With 1 
Zone
In this example we consider that an application wants to transfer 64 bytes data using TCP/IP 
protocol stack based on dynamic ML-IPsec tunnel mode. In tunnel mode ESP security 
protocol will be used, 3 DES will be used for encryption services and MD5 will be used for 
integrity value calculations. As key management is out of the scope of our research, so we 
assume that all databases and keying material are already configured manually. The dynamic 
ML-IPsec will be applied in following way:
•  As it is required by application to send this 64 bytes of data by applying dynamic ML- 
IPsec with 1 zone, so whole IP datagram will be encapsulated in 1 zone.
•  The IP datagram will be encapsulated in ESP header according to rules given in 
section 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. For output processing the rules given in 3.5.4.1 will be 
applied. The processing details will be as follows:
o The dynamic ML-IPsec will divide the IP datagram into 1 zone, 
o Assuming total IP datagram length is less than 128 bytes including 20 byte 
TCP header, 20 byte IP header and 64 bytes of data. So in ESP zone pointer 
will be of 7 bits. All the ESP procedure described in 3.5.3 will be followed  
according to the output processing steps outlined in section 3.5.4.1. The 
output packet ready to send after applying ML-IPsec processing should be 
like as given in below diagram.
Security Parameter Index (SPI) as set in database e.g. 2000
Sequence Number e.g. 100
Total Zones = 1 Pointer to Starting Padding Pad Length
(4 bits) Position of Zone 1 (16 bits) (5 bits)
(7 bits)
Encrypted ESP payload data for Zone 1 according to 3DES 
(including TCP header, IP header and 64 bytes of data)
Integrity Check Value for Zone 1 calculated according to MD5
Figure 3-10: ESP Header for Dynamic ML-IPsec with 1 Zone for IP datagram of 64 bytes data
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3.5.S.2 Dynamic ML-IPsec Working for 900 Bytes Data Packet with 2 
Zones
In this example we consider that an application wants to transfer 900 bytes data using TCP/IP 
protocol stack based on dynamic ML-IPsec tunnel mode. In tunnel mode ESP security 
protocol will be used, 3 DES will be used for encryption services and MD5 will be used for 
integrity value calculations. As key management is out of the scope of our research, so we 
assume that all databases and keying material are already configured manually. The dynamic 
ML-IPsec will be applied in following way:
•  As it is required by application to send this 900 bytes of data by applying dynamic 
ML-IPsec with 2 zones, so whole IP datagram will be encapsulated in 2 zones. TCP 
header will form 1 zone and remaining IP datagram without TCP header will form 
zone 2.
•  The IP datagram will be encapsulated in ESP header according to rules given in 
section 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. For output processing the rules given in 3.5.4.1 will be 
applied. The processing details will be as follows:
o , The dynamic ML-IPsec will divide the IP datagram into 2 zones.
Security Parameter Index (SPI) as set in database e.g. 2001
Sequence Number e.g. 101
Total Pointer to Pointer to Padding Pad
Zones = 2 . Starting Position Starting Position (3 bits) Length (5
of Zone 1 of Zone 2 bits)
(4 bits)
(10 bits) (10 bits)
Encrypted ESP payload data for Zone 1 according to 3DES 
(including TCP header only)
Integrity Check Value for Zone 1 calculated according to MD5
Encrypted ESP payload data for Zone 2 according to 3DES 
(including IP header and data)
Integrity Check Value for Zone 2 calculated according to MD5
Figure 3-11: ESP Header for Dynamic ML-IPsec with 1 Zone for IP datagram of 64 bytes data
o Assuming total IP datagram length Is less than 1024 bytes including 20 byte 
TCP header, 20 byte IP header and 900 bytes of data. So in ESP zone pointer
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will be of 10 bits. All the  ESP procedure described in 3.5.3 will be followed  
according to the output processing steps outlined in section 3.5.4.I. The 
output packet ready to send after applying ML-IPsec processing should be 
like as given in below diagram.
3.5.6 Security Services Offered By New ML-IPsec Protocol
The new ML-IPsec offers same security services as offered by IPsec and ML-IPsec including 
origin authentication, connectionless integrity, optional partial sequence integrity, data 
confidentiality and limited traffic flow confidentiality with the help of ESP.
3.5.7 Performance Evaluation of New Dynamic ML-IPsec Protocol
To evaluate the performance of new proposed dynamic ML-IPsec, we selected to modify the 
implementation of IPsec by “National Institute of Standards and Technology” (NIST). The 
simulator used by NIST was SSF/SSFNet and was developed in Java. For proof of study and 
analyze the network performance while running Dynamic ML-IPsec, we have modified the 
NIST IPsec implementation according to our proposed design. Following are the details of 
experiment performed.
3.5.7.1 Experiment Environment
A network of asymmetric type where one part of network only consists of clients and one part 
of network only contained servers were arranged in dumbbell topology as shown in figure 3- 
10. The clients and servers are addressed according to the “Network:Host(Interface) (NHI)” 
addressing scheme used in SSF/SSFNet. All the clients are addressed from 0:0(0) to 0:9(0) 
and servers are addressed 1:0(0) to 1:9(0) according to Network:Host(interface) format. These 
addresses are used by SSF/SSFNet for communication. The network consisted of a pair of 
security gateways and one or more hosts behind each gateway (connected with a LAN). Each 
gateway provides secure VPN services using Dynamic ML-IPsec and IPsec for the local hosts 
and acts as the SA initiator or the SA responder. All the experiments were performed in tunnel 
mode where a security policy controls the packets to be processed. For our experiment, we 
configured the host behind security gateway to create a security association among nodes.
In the experiment, we used manual key management. So at start of experiment, a SA was 
established for IKE and for IPsec/ML-IPsec. In ML-IPsec experiment, the SAs were different 
for different zones. The life time of SA was more than the experiment time, so that no re­
keying was required for life time of experiment.
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Clients Servers
0:0(0)
0 :1(0)
0:2(0)
0:3(0)
0:4(0)
0:5(0)
0:6(0)
Internet Connection = 1.5 Mpbs
Security Gateway 
0:500(0)
Security Gateway 
1:500(0)
^  1:0 (0 )
0  1:1(0)
^  1:2(0 )
1:3(0 ) 
^  1:4 (0) 
^  1:5(0)
0  1:6(0) 
0  1:7(0 ) 
0  1:8(0)
$ 2  1:9(0)
0 :7(0)
0:8(0)
0:3(0)
LAN Sp eed  = 100 Mpbs LAN Sp eed  = 1 0 0  Mpbs
Figure 3-12: A sample of network configuration used for experiment
3.5.7.2 Traffic Models
For simulation, different experiments were performed for file transfer between TCP clients 
and TCP servers. A client connects to a randomly chosen server and requests server to transfer 
a file of fixed size for the selected duration of experiment. A TCP-based application 
continuously generates fixed number of files traffic for each session for the duration of the 
experiment. The TCP clients wait for a random time period to send the next request after 
completion of the session.
3.5.7.3 Policy Setup in SSF/SSFNet Databases
The security policy can be setup in .dml files in SSF/SSFNet simulator. For ML-IPsec 
experiment, we have to modify the database entries with respect to zones. A sample of policy 
setup in SSF simulator is shown below in figures 3-11 and 3-12. The figure 3-11 shows the 
configuration performed in a gateway with id 500 and belongs to network 1. The same 
configuration is performed for the gateway attached to network 0 on other side of topology. 
The important parameter to mentioned configured in figure 3-11 is “ike_lifetime”. The 
“ike_lifeduration” field in figure 3-11 shows the life time of keys used for the experiment and 
for our experiment same keys were used for the whole life time of experiment as manual 
keying was used for our experiments. The other important parameter “zonepolicy” configured 
in security policy is shown in figure 3-12. “zonepolicy” field shows the access privileges for 
gateways in the selected topology. The “zonepolicy” specifies whether the gateway has read
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privilege or read write privileges for the IPsec protected packets passing through them. The 
detailed policy setup is available in the code CD ROM.
router [
id 500
interface [id 0 _extends iipsec.100Mb ]
interface [id 1 _extends .ipsec.l_5Mb ]
nhi_route [dest 1:500(0) interface 1]
_find .ipsec.sg_graph.graph 
security [
use_encrypt_delay true
  Æ gl.ob.al.,..,.d,e.f.a.uI.t valusa__________:_____
ike__lifetype SECONDS ike_lifeduration 2400 
;iu sé r |] i!k ë ^ sa ft^ |f  rile lid^keM sipff^thrdshol
ipsec_lifetype,SECONDS ipsec_lifeduration 2400
user_ipsec_soft true ipsec_soft_threshold 0 ipsec_random_delay 10
_extends .dictionary.crypto_delayO 
_extends .dictionary.ikespd_0_500 
ipsec_policy [
ipsec_interface [ id 1
_extends .dictionary.ipsecspd_0_500
]
]
# end of security
# end of router
Figure 3-13: A sample of Policy Setup for Keys Lifetime
spdentry
id 2
s e le c to r  [type SRC_IP value_type S value 0:0(0) ] 
selector [type DEST_IP
^p||p|||||||||||||||||||ph||SC!||
a c t io n  APPLY encap_mode TUNNEL remoteSG 1:500(0) 
sourceSG 0:500(0) usepfs t ru e  
extends .ipsec.ESP
Figure 3-14: A sample of Policy Setup for Zone Wise Access Privileges
3.S.7.4 Implementation of New ML-IPsec Protocol
For proof of study of proposed new dynamic ML-IPsec protocol, a Java implementation of 
IPsec provided by National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) is modified and 
simulated on SSF/SSFNet simulator.
NIST IPsec Implementation
NIST IPsec Implementation is programmed as a part of SSF/SSFNet Simulator. The IPsec 
part is programmed as standard Java classes which are extended by the SSF/SSFNet
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functionalities. SSF/SSFNET separates the implementation into OS kernel and user space. If 
someone needs to work on lower networking layers, the functionality of those layers can be 
extended easily. NIST IPsec class also extends the IP header class which is part of OS kernel. 
Here OS means the SSF/SSFNet simulator.
The below diagram shows that Key Management components run in user space and IPsec 
functionality is implemented as part of the OS kernel. The major components of NIST 
implementation model are described below:
IKE Manager
IKE Manager is responsible for all the IKE functionality for setting up the initial security 
associations, child associations for tunnel mode communication, talking to databases and key 
exchanges. In the model, IKE Key Manager communicates with OS using the “PF Key” API 
which provides interoperable way for heterogeneous communication mechanisms (key 
Management).
IPsec Manager
IPsec Manager provides the security services for a node or gateway. It processes every 
incoming or outgoing packet and applies the security protection according to the security 
policy. In the implementation model, it is implemented as an extension to IP class 
implemented in the OS kernel section. The IPsec key manager also communicates with OS via 
“PF Key API”.
Databases
The SPD and SAD keep information about the security policies and security associations 
respectively. In the implementation model IPsec and IKE manage their own databases SAD 
and SPD independently.
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NIST IPSec Implementation
SSF ImplementationKey Management
(IKE Manager)
IKE Key 
Manager
User Space
OS Kernel
IPSec Key 
Manager
IKE
SAD
IRSec
SRP
IPSac Manager
PF Key 
(Generic Socket 
API)
PF INET 
(Protocol Family 
Internet Socket 
API)
NIC
Figure 3-15: A diagram showing the implementation model of NIST IPsec
3.5.7.4.1 Dynamic ML-IPsecImplementation Model
The ML-IPsec functionality is provided by enhancing the functionality of NIST IPsec. We are 
trying to keep the implementation model in compliance with NIST implementation model for 
a comparison of complexity implementation between IPsec and ML-IPsec implementation 
with variable number of zones.
The following diagram shows the implementation model adopted by usbased on NIST IPsec.
Dynamic ML-IPSec 
Implementation
(SSF Or Linux) 
implementationManual Setup of Security 
Associations and 
Keys
SPD
Manual Key 
Setup (IKE Key 
Manager)
SAD
User SpacePFINET 
(Protocol Family 
Internet Socket 
API)
PF Key or 
Some other way 
to communicate OS Kernel
UDP/TCP
Manual Key 
Setup (IPSec 
Key Manager)SPD IP/IPSec
NIC
SAD
Network
Figure 3-16: Proposed Dynamic ML-IPsec implementation Model
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3.S.7.4.2 Performance Measures
The purpose of the study was proof of concept of dynamic ML-IPsec that it functions 
according to the policy and we achieved similar behaviour between IPsec and proposed ML- 
IPsec for same set of security related experiments. We also tried to compare the network 
performance while running IPsec and ML-IPsec for different traffic loads and different 
network bandwidth configurations.
Packet Stat:
S2te«'ay=i:50Q ( 0 . 0 . 0 . Oj: 
in i t ia l  reçuests=0, rekeying request3=0
unprotected=344563 (inbound;172305, outbound:17225S) 
byp23sed=70 (inbound:35, outbound:35), 
protected=344563 (inbound;17225S, outbound:172305), 
discarded=0 (inbound:0, outbound;0) 
error dropped=0 (inbound: 0, outbound: 0) 
noSA dropped=0 (inbound: 0, outbound: 0)
=> Total Packets: 6S9196 (unprotected:344563, 
protected:344633
Sateway=0:500 (0.0.0.32): 
in i t ia l  requests=10, rekeying requests=0
unprotected=344359 (inbound;172277, outbound:172082) 
bypassed=70 finbound;35, outbound;35), 
protected=344345 (inbound:172082, outbound:172267), 
discarded=0 (inkound:Q, outboundrO) 
error dropped=0 (inbound: 0, outbound: 0) 
noSA dropped=10 (inbound: 0,  outbound: 10)
=> Total Packets: 688788 (unprotected:344358, 
protected:34442§
P a c k e t  S t a t i s t i c s  f o r  I F S e c
Packet Stat;
Gateway=l:500 (0.0.0.0); 
in itia l req!ssts=0, rekeying regiest3=0
uiçrotected=34389ü (inbound: 171^0, mtbound:171940) 
bypassed=70 (inbound:35, outbouai:35), 
protected=3438S0 (inbound: 171940, outbound: 171950), 
discar{fed=0 (inbound: 0, sitbound:0) 
error drcrped=D (inbound: 0, oitbænd: 0) 
no5A dropped=0 (inbound: 0, outbound: Q)
=> Total ^cfcets: 687850 (uiçrotected: 343890, 
protected:343960
Satssay=0:500 (0.0.0.32): 
in itia l request3=10, rekeying requ2sts=0
urprctected=343722 (inbound:171958, outbound: 171764) 
bypassffii=70 (inbound:35, outbound:35), 
protected=343712 (inbound: 171764, outbamd: 171 948), 
discanfed=0 (inbound: 0, outbound: 0) 
error dromed=0 (inbound: 0, aitbamd: 0) 
ncSA dropped=10 (inbound: 0, outbound: 10)
=> Total Factets: 687514 (urçrotected:343722, 
protected:343792
P a c k e t  S t a t i s t i c s  f o r  M L - I P S e c  ( w i t h  1  z o n e )
Figure 3-17; Packet statistics to show application on Security Policy on IPsec and ML-IPsec
The packet statistics shown in figure 3-15 are counted according to the security policy 
enforcement and selected network conditions. We counted the 
protected/unprotected/bypassed/error packets for both inbound and outbound independently 
within a security gateway.
For the application layer, we gathered the session throughput for different network conditions. 
We run the simulation in tunnel mode for fixed time. The internet connection between 
securities gateways were configured for different bandwidth values from 1 Mbps to 10 Mbps 
to see the effects of network bandwidth with respect to traffic load. To change the traffic load,
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we changed the file sizes from 1 Mbytes to 20 Mbytes. The security attributes like 
3DES_CBC, AES or HMAC_SHA1 etc, can change the overall performance under specific 
environment. We considered the affects of our selected security schemes to play a role in our 
analysis. The cryptographic figures used for our experiment are given below and are in 
consistence with NIST IPsec experiment.
Algorithms Block Size Key Size
3_DES_CBC 8 bytes 24 bytes
HMAC_SHA1 64 bytes 20 bytes
Table 3-18: Cryptographic Figures used for experiment
As shown in table 3-17 and 3-18, overall throughput of network becomes stable once the 
network can handle all the transmitted data efficiently. There remains unnoticeable difference 
between the performance while running IPsec and ML-IPsec with different number of zones.
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File Size Bandwidth Average Throughput
(IVB) (Mbps) IPSec ML-IPSec (IZone) ML-IPSec (2 Zones) ML-IPSec (3 Zones)
5 1 94.349 94.172 93.409 93.323
5 2 189.743 189.39 187^3 187.648
5 3 244.85 244.844 244.861 244.858
5 4 245.257 245.255 245.246 245.245
5 5 245.45 245.438 245.441 245.447
5 6 245.508 245.508 245.505 245.505
5 7 245,606 245.606 245,599 245.6
5 8 245.622 245.621 245.621 245.621
5 9 245.701 245.701 245.704 245.7
5 10 245.717 245.717 245.716 245.716
Table 3-19: Measurements for Network Throughput for file size of SMBytes
5 M B  F i le  S i z e
300
250
Q. 150
1 00
MlPSec
H  ML-IPSec (1 Zone) 
SM L-IPSec(2 Zones) 
»  ML-IPSec (3 Zones)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LinkCapaicity (Mbps)
Figure 3-20: Network Throughput for file size of SMBytes
However, when network speed is less than the speed at which processor is transmitting the 
data on the network; we have observed that configuration where less processing is involved 
gives better performance as compared to configuration where high processing is required. 
Hence in low bandwidth network, obviously IPsec gives better performance as compared to
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ML-IPsec. However, this difference is not very high. We only selected two graphs to show the 
throughput for low data traffic and high data traffic only.
Pile
Size Bandwidth Average Throughput
(MB) (Mbps) IPSec ML-IPSec (1 Zone) M L-IPSec (2 Zones) ML-IPSec (3 Zones)
20 1 92.842 92.669 91.906 91.82 2
20 2 185.095 184.74 183.235 183D7
20 3 2 51 .796 251.793 251.776 251 .776
20 4 252.02 252.02 252.01 252.006
20 5 2 52.13 252.13 252.13 252.13
20 6 2 52.23 252.23 252.22 252.22
20 7 252.286 252.286 252.286 252.283
20 8 252.336 252.333 252.33 2 5 2 3 3
20 9 252.336 252 .336 252.33 2 5 2 3 3
20 10 252.403 252.4 252.396 252.396
Table 3-21: Measurements for Network Throughput for file size of 20MBytes
20M B  File Size
3 0 0
2 5 0
S 200
a  1 5 0
g  100
3 4 51 2 6 7 8 9 10
LinkCapaicity (M b ps)
« I P S e c
®  M L -IP S ec( l  Zone)  
a M L - I P S e c ( 2  Zones)  
S M L - l P S e c ( 3  Zones)
Figure 3-22: Network Throughput for file size of 20MBytes
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The figure also demonstrates that as file size increases, the TCP application utilizes the 
network bandwidth better as compared to low file sizes. The low file size degrades the 
network performance to very small extent.
3.6Limitations of Implementation
The analysis was performed using SSF/SSFNet simulator and NIST IPsec implementation. 
However, for our analysis there are some limitations inherited from NIST IPsec 
implementation and SSF/SSFNet implementation which are given below:
• No actual implementation of cryptographic algorithms, keys and cryptographic 
operations is done. However, the security processing behaviour was simulated 
alongside processing block size and processing time.
• The header sizes and data sizes may be different from actual implementations for 
different constraints of Java language.
However, the overall behaviour of IPsec, ML-IPsec will not be some much different from real 
implementation.
3.7 Summary
In chapters 2-3, the ML-IPsec protocol is discussed as a solution for TCP/IP based challenged 
networks. The performance for these challenged networks is improved using PEPs. The ML- 
IPsec can solve the interworking issues between intermediate devices such as PEPs and IPsec. 
ML-IPsec enables PEPs to access a limited portion of IP datagram for their proper functioning 
while end-to-end data confidentiality is preserved by ML-IPsec. However, there are some 
issues in original ML-IPsec solution like limited application domain, which can be resolved 
by new dynamic ML-IPsec by making application more flexible to break IP datagram into 
different zones. The new dynamic ML-IPsec also improves the efficiency and reduces 
complexity to encapsulate the zones information into ESP payload. Some results of our 
analysis for security policy enforcement and network performance evaluation with different 
network bandwidth and traffic load are shown. It is observed that ML-IPsec gives almost same 
performance as IPsec performs when network bandwidth is more than 3 Mbps. However, 
when network bandwidth is low, then there is small performance reduction as compared to 
IPsec.
In remaining chapters, the security will be discussed with reference to a new networking 
paradigm called “Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN)”.
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4 Security in Delay/Disruption Tolerant 
Networking (DTN) Based Networks
TCP has been success for today internet based networks. Basically, TCP is based on following 
three assumptions [36]:
1. End-to-End path always exist between communicating parties.
2. Maximum round trip time is not so excessive.
3. Packet loss probability is small.
So any network which violates these assumptions will not give good performance over TCP 
protocol.
Node A Node B
Application Layer Application Layer
Transport Layer (TCP) Transport Layer (TCP)
Network Layer (IP) Network Layer (IP)
Network Access Layer Network Access Layer
Figure 4-1: Inter-process Communication using TCP/IP Protocol Stack
There is lot of growth in non-internet networks over last few years. These networks do not 
comply with the assumptions on which TCP is built. Such networks are called “Challenged 
Networks” [36].
Challenged networks can have following properties:
• End-to-End path does not always exist. Different types of disruptions can be caused:
o Networks can be partitioned unexpectedly, 
o Networks can be partitioned in a predictable manner, 
o The partition or networks availability can be scheduled.
• Maximum round trip time can be very high.
• Paeket loss probability is also greater than TCP based networks.
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4.1 Characteristics of Challenged Networks
The challenged networks have variable latency, bandwidth, error probability, and node 
longevity and path stability [33-37]. The latency depends on different things in end-to-end 
communications.
Latency = Transmission + Propagation + Processing + Queuing Delay
Transmission and propagation delay are dependent on the medium and processing and queuing 
delay dependent on capability of devices. In challenged networks we can have very high 
latency and very low data rate e.g. 10kbps is the data rate for acoustic networks. The networks 
also have asymmetric behaviour e.g. large channel for relaying data but a simple uplink 
channel.
End-to-end disconnection may be more common than connection. The disconnection can be 
due to a fault or not a fault. The disconnection which is not result of a fault is more frequent in 
wireless networks due to motion and low duty cycle operation. The disconnection due to 
motion is highly predictable e.g. satellite passes or busses that act as routers, and also 
opportunistic e.g. nodes arriving in communication range of satellite or bus. The disconnection 
due to low duty cycle is more common in sensor networks.
The queuing time in challenged networks is very high even hours or days. The TCPsupports 
maximum of delay of two minutes after that packets are dropped [9].
4.2 Different Proposed DTN Architectures
Here we discuss different solutions to work such networks on TCP/IP and then we identify the 
best approach out of all and discuss that in more detail [36].
We can change the problems in such a way that the behavior of networks can be made 
compliant with TCP/IP based networks and then such networks can run on TCP/IP. But, it will 
require lot of effort to change to make such networks complaint to TCP/IP and every 
application which will be developed on such networks will also need to be modified
We can attach such networks to the edge of internet, thus we can make these networks as part 
of internet through specialized proxies. But, then the problem remains for Communication 
inside these networks.
We can establish an overlay network on all challenged networks as well as on internet based 
networks. This will provide the inter-communication within networks and with internet-based 
networks. And it will also reduce the effort required to change TCP/IP compliant with
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challenged networks and every network will be able to use its specialized protocols according 
to its characteristics.
The overlay approach is the better approach out of all these described solutions. The protocol 
being developed based on overlay approach is “Bundle protocol” which will run on layer 
introduced called “Bundle Layer”.
4.3 Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN)
“Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN)” architecture is a store-and-forward network 
overlay [34]. It can help to provide communication between heterogeneous challenged 
networks using different protocol families. DTN uses the Bundle Protocol (BP) to provide 
store-and-forward kind of services. BP sits at application layer in many constituent networks, 
forming a store-and-forward overlay network. The key capabilities of BP include:
• Ability to inter-connect heterogeneous networks, e.g. nodes with different power
capabilities or running different sets of communication protocols etc.
• Ability to make an intermediate node as a custodian of bundle for storing the received
bundle in the persistent storage and forward the bundle in suitable network conditions.
• Ability to provide services in scheduled, predicted and opportunistic connectivity in
addition to continuous connectivity, thereby providing different options to provide 
good services in different delays/disrupted environments. [33, 34, 35]
Bundle Protocol (BP) rely on underlying networking protocols for end-to-end successful 
communication. BP supports implementation of a layer called “Convergence Layer (CL)” as a 
means to send and receive bundles from underlying ‘native protocols’. The manner, in which 
CL sends and receives bundles, is totally implementation matter and can have different 
requirements according to underlying protocol (TCP, UDP) needs.
4.3.1 DTN Motivating Applications
4.3.1.1 Vehicular DTN Networks
VANETS (Vehicular Networks) are wireless networks comprised of vehicle to vehicle or 
vehicle to infrastructure communication. The potential applications for VANETs are 
categorized under road safety, traffic efficiency and/or on demand entertainment applications. 
Vehicle Safety Communication Consortium (VSC) has analysed many road safety application
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e.g. Traffic lights violation warning, emergency brake lights, pre crash warnings and 
cooperative forward collision warning etc. In transport efficiency category, the Car-to-Car 
Communication Consortium (-C2C) has listed many applications including enhanced 
navigation system, lane merging help and optimal speed advisory etc. On demand applications 
like POI (point of interest) notification, fuel consumption management, internet browsing, 
tolling etc can be based vehicle to infrastructure networks.
VANETS are comprised of, 1) vehicle to vehiele in ad-hoc networks e.g. when a car finds 
congestion or lane blockage, it can inform the cars within the range of its transmission which 
in turn can forward to next available cars, thus making a multi-hop adhoc communication 
network. The receiving cars can change their way accordingly, 2) vehicle to infrastructure 
networks e.g. if some business wants to notify the cars passing through their premises, they 
can deploy road side units (RSUs) to send the desired information to passing cars. The above 
described applieations needs the cost analysis and can be deployed or implemented depending 
upon the suitability for users.
DTN is a suitable networking technology for VANETS. When a RSU tries to deliver the 
internet service to a vehicle, it can deliver the packet to the vehicle directly if within range of 
RSU. But, because RSU have limited range and service requesting vehicle may not be in direct 
range of RSU, but service can be provided by multi-hop communication. The passing vehicle 
can receive the data and buffer it until the desired vehicle is within range or there is an 
opportunity to forward to next hop. This kind of communication is called “Store-and-Forward” 
communication. Such way, VANETS can also be used to provide low cost internet services to 
remote villages or to collect data from the monitoring devices in remote areas.
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Figure 4-2 An example of DTN VANETs
4.3.1.2 Lake Pollution Monitoring
In many European lakes, pollution of various kinds is becoming a more and more a problem. 
To monitor the lakes, a cost-effective and good solution is through different kinds of sensors in 
a network. Sensors are deployed scarce due to issues of dense deployment access problems, 
cost etc. When deployed scarce the short range transmitter cannot create a connected network. 
Different data mules (like a boat) can be used to travel in the lake and collect data from sensors 
and transfer to data servers in scheduled manners. For such kind of disconnected environments 
DTN is suitable.
4.3.1.3 Deep Space Missions
Deep-Space missions have roughly five phases: prelaunch, cruise, approach, mission at target 
point and return. The DTN approach is needed after launch of space craft. So, in pre-launch 
phase the DTN approach is not a requirement. However it can be used in a way that it equally 
works well under same configurations. After launch phase, DTN is necessity due to long 
delays in orbit setting, packet loss, and long delays in reaching the communication signal to 
devices on earth from deep space. There can be situations in which the robot in not in direct 
sight from ground station. So data can be transmitted through orbiters.
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4.3.1.4 Terrestrial Mobile Networks
Mobile networks are also non-internet networks which do not fulfil the assumption that End- 
to-End path always exist between communicating parties. A) Mobile networks can be 
partitioned un-expectedly due to radios interference. B) Mobile networks can also have 
predictable disruption, like a bus having limited RF range can communicate to network 
devices in that limited range. However buses usually run on a route in periodic way so the 
network connectivity is predictable.
4.3.1.5 Sensor/Actuator Networks
Sensor network is formed of small sensor devices. They have limitations of power, processing 
and communication range. To save power in sensor networks usually the Communication is 
scheduled. The intermittent path property includes them in challenged networks.
4.3.2 DTN Overlay Architecture
The DTN architecture is a message based overlay architecture for interoperability between and 
among challenged networks named “Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) Architecture” [33-37]. 
Messages aggregates are known as “Bundles” and are routed by “Bundle Forwarders” or 
“Bundle Gateways”. The basic layers of DTN nodes are shown below in figure 4-2.
A DTN node is a device which can send and receive bundles and a DTN specific router is 
device which makes the decision to forward the bundles to successfully deliver it to its 
destination. Unlike other network routers, the DTN router support bundle layer and can have 
optional Application layer as well.
Optional Application Layer
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Figure 4-3: DTN Nodes showing DTN Layers 
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In terms of communication the DTN architecture has concept of regions and DTN gateways. 
One region is assumed of one kind of network and their boundaries address the different 
protocol families. We can say that if two nodes in a network can communicate with each other 
without using DTN gateways then they belong to same region. The DTN gateway is different 
from ARPANET style gateways because they provide best effort service while the DTN 
gateway provides the reliable data transmission service andstore the data in a persistent storage 
instead of volatile storage.
Naming. Addressing and Binding are most fundamental part of a network. Because as 
overlay network, DTN will run on many different networks and there will be requirements of 
many different naming conventions. So from the work of IETF Universal Resource Identifiers 
(URIs) has been selected as naming scheme for DTN network. Every host in the network is 
identified by an identifier. The URIs provide allocated name spaces, support variable length of 
address and flexibility of current and future naming semantics and structures. DTN support 
both early and late binding depending on the scheme used. In terms of DTN, late binding is 
called because the forwarding decision is based on the entries present in the routing nodes.
In DTN architecture there are three defined classes of service.
The bundles of expedited category are delivered prior to bundles of any other class. The 
bundles in the expedited traffic are transferred before starting the forwarding of bundles of any 
other class. Starvation avoiding of low classes of bundles can be handled by some algorithms.
Normal class bundles are forwarded before the bundles of ’’Best Effort” class and after the 
Expedited class bundles. This class bundle wait in the queue until all expedited class bundles 
have been forwarded.
This class is same as of “Best Effort” forwarding of ARPANET type networks. These will be 
shipped until all other classes bundles have been forwarded to next hop.
Routing is very important in network architecture. Because DTN supports large number of 
networks, so routing should also be suitable for many kinds of networks. It is possible that 
DTN routing scheme will be combination of many different strategies including straight 
forwarding and support for large delays. It will also be included that send bundles through 
different paths depending upon reliability and class of service.
Time synchronization is necessary for scheduled communications. The most forward way to 
achieve this is that both sender and receiver have at least synchronized clocks and this is what 
currently bundle protocol assumes. The time synchronization will also be used for bundle 
expiry record and the bundle will be discarded which is in flight and its time has been passed.
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It is desirable to write a protocol for time synchronization based on NTP, Network Time 
Protocol.
4.3.3 DTN Networking Issues
DTN handles the delays and disruptions at new layer called “Bundle Layer”. Although Bundle 
protocol specifications are available in RFC 5050, however there are some important issues 
needed to be addressed before its acceptance for real world implementations. The issues 
included are routing, integrity validation at intermediate hops, time synchronization etc. 
However, routing is major concern and being addressed in research community [34].
In DTN routing the major concern is that the communication links may not be available all the 
times. Different routing protocols have been proposed for routing in DTN store-and-forward 
environment. Here we review some of the existing routing schemes briefly. Routing in DTN 
has challenges of link/contact availability, disruption in the network due to mobility or 
network characteristics and network resources availability to maximize the throughput. The 
link availability can be affected by many reasons. In interplanetary communication, the 
presence of other objects (including small planets) between the communicating planets can 
affect the availability of links however, due to physics laws the availability of contacts can be 
predicted. This kind of links availability is called “predicted” or scheduled. The opportunistic 
contacts can become available in adhoc networks where a mobile node, like data mule, can 
become available opportunistically and data can be transferred to the available node.
The popular taxonomy for DTN routing protocols is based on the no. of copies being 
forwarded in the network, single copy or multi copy. There is a trade-off between the network 
throughput and consumption of network resources. If a single copy is forwarded in the 
network, then there is assurance that a single copy exist in the network but, if multiple copies 
are forwarded in the network then it increases the delivery ratio of bundles compared to single 
copy forwarding, but there may be multiple copies of the bundles in the network which can 
consume more network resources. Some popular routing mechanisms for DTN are: epidemic 
routing, PROPHET, Max Prop basics. Max Prop additions. Resource Allocation Protocol for 
International DTN Routing (RAPID) and Spray and Wait. However, these multi-copy 
protocols raise issues of network congestion, consuming precious network resources, like 
bandwidth, energy etc, and network scalability.
Although routing is major concern in DTN, however more issues are also being address in the 
different areas including time synchronization, buffer capacity, and power management and 
increasing capacity of the network by deploying static nodes. Lot of effort has been put
61
Chapter 4: DTN
towards solving the networking issues in DTN, yet the security in DTN has not been paid 
much attention.
4.3.4 Security for DTN Based Networks
4.3.4.I Threat Analysis for DTN Networks
Some of DTN specific threats are [39-44]:
Because DTN bundle approach is an overlay network over existing network, so easy target for 
different networks because, if DTN bundles can be Inserted into lower layers then, DTN 
layer should be ready to receive such bundles which can be forged and can cause different 
kinds of destructions. Such bundles should be effectively detected and deleted.
Resource access and use of resources are serious concerns in DTN networks due to resource 
scarcity that characterizes DTN. Unauthorized access can cause different problems, some 
possible cases are as follows: Bundle insertion by unauthorized entities, unauthorized 
applications can cause destruction e.g. setting up inefficient routes. Authorized applications 
requiring quality of service for which they are not authorized, modifying bundles to increase 
traffic by generating reports etc.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can be mounted on any network layer, so special 
considerations should be taken for such attacks. Every security protocol can become cause for 
DoS attacks, so following measures can be taken to avoid “offpath” and “on-path” DoS 
attacks. “Off-Path” attacks can be made hard to launch by making it hard to guess the valid 
values for messages and “On-Path” attacks can resisted by a way to choke-off DoS traffic e.g. 
only accepting the authenticated packets, while dropping all other packets.
DTN applications can also be vulnerable to confidentiality and integrity threats. Some possible 
cases are as follows:
• Changing bundle's source,
• Falsifying the intended destination.
• Changing bundle's control fields.
• Changing other block or payload fields.
• Replay of bundles.
• Copying or disclosing bundle data as it passes.
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Traffic storms are storms of bundles. Different ways can be used to storm the DTN network 
by modifying or forging the bundles. In DTN traffic can be generated through different kinds 
of reports i.e. custody signal or bundle status report. It is prohibited in different kinds of 
bundles to reports to be generated. Like for administrative packets, the flag cannot be set to 
generate report. However, different flags options should be considered to avoid the traffic 
storms.
4.3.5 Secure Communication in DTN Networks
DTN provides security architecture to provide security services for DTN compliant 
applications. The current security architecture provides the hop-by-hop integrity and 
authentication and end-to-end integrity, authentication and confidentiality security services. 
Protection against attacks, like DoS attacks, traffic analysis protection, and key management 
are still open issues in DTN security [39,40].
The participants in the secure communication in DTN networks are as follows:
• Source - the bundle node which originates bundle.
• Destination - the bundle node to which a bundle is ultimately destined.
• Forwarder - the bundle node that forwards the bundle on its most recent hop 
intermediate receiver or next hop. Security Source -  The node which applies the 
security blocks on bundles.
• Security destination -  the node which processes all the security blocks on bundles on 
behalf of destination.
• Security source and security destination can be different from original source and 
destination.
Security block -  a block of some fields to add in the bundle which helps in providing the 
security services in DTN communication. Three types of blocks have been proposed in DTN 
for authentication (Bundle Authentication Block BAB, integrity (Payload Integrity Block) and 
confidentiality (Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB). One bundle can include one or more 
security blocks depending upon the requirements for the network. A security block can be 
derived from different security suites using symmetric or asymmetric type of cryptography 
[39,40].
The figure 4-4 shows two DTN nodes BN 1 and BN4 in different networks connected via DTN
gateways BN2 and BN3. BNl is a source (the node which originates bundle) which originates
a bundle to send to BN4 securely. It wants to ensure integrity, authentication of source BN I
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and confidentiality for data. Because, bandwidth is very important resource for DTN type of 
networks, the architecture allowsintegrity to be validated and it should be ensured that bundle 
is coming from trusty node, on hop-by-hop basis before forwarding the bundle to next hop and 
to maximize the throughput by using the feature of store-and-forward communication.
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Figure 4-4 Heterogeneous networks interconnected via DTN gateways using Bundle Protocol
4.3.5.1 Hop-by-Hop Integrity and Authentication
DTN security architecture supports hop-by-hop integrity validation and authentication. It is to 
ensure that bundle being forwarded to next hop is not altered and coming from trusted route. 
As bandwidth is very important resource for DTN type of networks, so this feature is very 
important in order to take the benefits of store-and-forward custody transfer. In our selected 
scenario in figure 4-4, the integrity and authentication need to be verified on BN2, BN3 and 
BN4, thus forming 3 security zones. A security zone is a communication path between a 
security source (the node which applies the security features) and security destination (the 
node which verifies the security features). The figure 4-5 shows the hop-by-hop integrity and 
authentication provision in our selected scenario according to DTN security architecture. DTN 
suggests making security calculations (e.g. Message Authentication Code) and storing the 
results in a dedicated security block called “Bundle Authentication Block (BAB)”. This BAB 
has a place in the blocks stack of bundle protocol and is processed on hop-by-hop basis 
according to security features selected. More details are available in [40].
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Figure 4-5: A diagram showing provision of hop-by-hop integrity and authentication features
according to DTN security architecture
4.3.5.2 End-to-End Integrity and Authentication
For end-to-end verification of integrity and authentication provision, a separate security block 
called “Payload Integrity Block (FIB)” is provided by DTN security architecture. FIB stores 
the calculations results made on data and is available for processing at the security destination. 
In our selected scenario, for end-to-end integrity and authentication, there is only one security 
zone as bundle originator is security source and bundle destination is also security destination. 
The figure 4-6 shows end-to-end integrity and authentication functionality provided in our 
selected scenario according to DTN security architecture.
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4.3.5.3 End-to-End Confidentiality
DTN security architecture also provides a confidentiality feature to protect the contents that are 
not to be disclosed to unauthorized entities on the path from source to destination. A separate 
security block called “Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB)” is dedicated for this purpose. The 
results of calculations (e.g. encrypted data) are placed inside the PCB block which can be 
processed by the security destination to get the original data. For our selected scenario in 
figure 4-4 , only one security zone exists between source and destination as they are also the 
security source and security destination. Figure 4-7 shows the PCB working in DTN security 
architecture.
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'DTN has gained popularity and many articles and papers can be seen in Journals and 
conference proceedings but, not much effort has put towards security issues in DTN. As 
Steffen Farrell has pointed out that key management is a very complex and open issue [45]. 
Based on the literature available [39-45], we have drawn some design guidelines for key 
management in DTN which are given below.
4.3.6 Design Guidelines for Key Management
The heterogeneity requirements and communication types are supported by DTN architecture 
for underlying communication. DTN architecture supports and manages the delay and 
disruption well by set of DTN protocols like Bundle protocol etc. Different resources can also 
take benefit from the DTN concept of security source and security destination. The key 
management protocol can designed in a way to comply with DTN architecture to provide 
maximum support for these requirements.
From the above, we can take account of the following guidelines for the design of key 
management protocol:
• A whole framework is required for key management in DTN; a single scheme cannot work 
due to heterogeneity of networks as well as network resources.
• The scheme must support bundle cipher suites which is provided by security blocks. These 
blocks require both symmetric as well asymmetric types of cryptography.
• To provide end-to-end key exchange protocol, some trust can be assumed between 
controlling bodies of both regions.
• More key management information should be transferred between nodes, as bundles 
support large amount of data to be transferred.
• As DTN is based on store and forward concept, it requires persistent storage and memory 
is very cheap, so large memory can available for DTN nodes. This memory can be utilized 
to reduce the number of key exchanges.
• The key management should provide at least one mechanism for key transport as well as 
for key agreement.
• Some kind of policy based key exchange mechanism can be defined, as policy based 
routing is gaining very popularity in DTN community. This concept can be used to transfer 
maximum key exchange information to reduce the number of key exchanges.
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• DTN node connectivity, computation and storage capabilities vary enormously, so scheme 
should have support for highly challenged nodes.
4.4 Further Discussion
4.4.1 ONE Simulator
Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator is an evaluation system specifically 
designed for DTN behaviour and routing protocols. The main functions of ONE simulator are 
the modelling of node movement, routing, message handling and inter-node contacts [49, 50].
Node movement is implemented by different movement models which are either synthetic 
models or based on existing movement traces. The routing functions are implemented by 
providing support of different routing algorithms. It already provides support for six different 
DTN routing algorithms and still flexible enough that new routing modules can be easily 
added to the simulator. The simulator is an event based simulator and events are generated via 
different generators. The messages are always unicast from a single source to a single 
destination. At the end, the simulation results are collected through different report generators. 
Simulator provides a flexible way to add new reports generators. The complete features and 
their detailed discussions are available in [49, 50].
Besides all above described features, ONE simulator still has some limitations as well. Firstly, 
it does not implement the bundle headers. Secondly, better modelling of nodes characteristics 
e.g. power consumption etc. and message generations activities are big requirements for ONE 
team to focus. However, with all these limitations, the behaviour simulated by ONE simulator 
for DTN should not be so much different from real implementation. Yet, ONE simulator is 
best and most advanced option publically available to simulate DTN environment.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of DTN technology is presented along with different applications 
for DTN. It also includes details of DTN architecture and how different DTN nodes, DTN 
routers, DTN gateways, play role in bundle layer functioning. The chapter also discusses 
Bundle protocol (BP) and Bundle Security Protocol specifications (BSP) in detail along with 
an example to describe the complete functionality of the BP and the BSP. The chapter also 
includes the security issues in DTN with special focus on key management. At the end DTN 
simulator, the specially designed simulator for DTN called ONE; overview is presented.
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The later chapters discuss the key management issues in detail along with the solutions to 
solve those issues.
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5 An Efficient, Scalable Key Transport 
Scheme (ESKTS) for Delay/Disruption 
Tolerant Networks based on Public Key 
Cryptography
Key management is considered an open issue in DTN community. All phases of key 
management, like key generation, key transport, key storage and rekeying etc., have different 
requirements for DTN but, to provide a key exchange mechanism suitable for DTN 
environment is a big challenge. In DTN, malicious nodes (routers) can try to inject false 
bundles to spoil the network resources. This is a big threat for DTN due to resource scarcity. 
Further, the data confidentiality is also required for end-to-end communication.
The current bundle security protocol (BSP) has provided a mechanism to prevent the 
unauthorized access and utilization of DTN resources while also maintain the end-to-end 
confidentiality by introducing different security blocks appended with actual payload. As 
described earlier, these are BAB, PIB to provide hop-by-hop and end-to-end integrity and 
authentication and PCB to provide end-to-end confidentiality. The provision of all these 
security features is dependent upon cryptographic keys and BSP assumes presence of keys on 
all the intermediate and end nodes.
As DTN “Store-and-forward” characteristics require the bundles to be stored at intermediate
nodes, in case no communication link is present or in case of high disruption, bundles can be
forwarded by these intermediate nodes. This “store-and-forward” characteristic of DTN also
requires that key exchange mechanism should have fewer round trips because the traditional
key exchange mechanism might not be suitable and not scale well in DTN as designed for two
communicating parties without considering the hop-by-hop integrity and authentication.
Therefore such mechanism, in which key can be transported securely along with data, should
be very suitable for DTN while being compliant with BSP. The “Efficient Scalable Key
Transport Scheme (ESKTS)” provides a way to transport the symmetric key, generated at a
DTN node, to other communicating body securely along with the data. ESKTS ensures that
integrity and authentication is achieved at hop-by-hop level as well as end-to-end level. It also
ensures end-to-end confidentiality and freshness for end communicating parties. Because,
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every time a key can be generated according to selected cipher suite and can be transported 
along with data, therefore it is communication efficient and.well scalable.
This is unique effort towards providing a secure symmetric key transport mechanism based on 
public key cryptography to exploit the unique bundle buffering characteristics of DTN; 
specially opportunistic networks, to reduce communication and computation cost. The 
remainder of chapter is organized in sections to describe the network model, adversary model, 
design goals and detailed description of the ESKTS. At the end of the chapter the efficiency 
evaluation by simulations and security evaluation are presented.
5.1 Preliminaries
5.1.1 Bundle Security and Challenges
In the design of DTN architecture, a big consideration is the security provision [5]. The bundle 
security protocol provides a general framework to prevent the malicious efforts to exploit the 
DTN resources and to save scarce network resources. The BSP uses BAB, PIB and PCB to 
provide a general framework for integrity, authentication and confidentiality on hop-by-hop 
and end-to-end basis which is in compliance with bundle protocol specifications [33]. 
Different cipher suites based on symmetric and asymmetric cryptography have been proposed 
in [37, 39] and there is facility to add customised cipher suites as well. Symmetric key should 
be used for encryption and decryption of data to provide end-to-end confidentiality as we 
know that asymmetric cryptography is very costly as compared to symmetric cryptography.
Due to resource scarcity in DTN especially bandwidth, communication efficiency represents a 
critical problem for security protocols design. Using a mechanism to exchange keys between 
communicating nodes based on many iterations and then use that key for subsequent 
communications may face the challenge of expensive communication cost. Communication 
efficiency in DTN security protocols design is extremely important because in DTN typically 
multiple copies of bundle are transmitted in the network for routing to increase the delivery 
ratio of bundles.
We try to address these above described issues in ESKTS. The general objectives are to 
minimize the communication cost to reduce the number of iterations. ESKTS also supports the 
BSP design of hop-by-hop integrity, authentication and end-to-end integrity, authentication 
and confidentiality. Once symmetric key is transferred from source to destination based on 
ESKTS, it can be used to encrypt data for later on communications at reduced computational 
cost as compared to encryption based on public key cryptography.
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5.1.2 Proxy Signatures and Their Transfer without presence of Secure 
Channel
A proxy signature enables the original signer to delegate his signing capability to proxy entity. 
The proxy entity can sign the messages on the behalf of signer while the capabilities of proxy 
entity are restricted by the original signer. The proxy signer can further delegate the 
capabilities to other proxy entities by generating the proxy signatures based on received proxy 
signatures to form a chain of proxy signatures to delegate the signing capabilities. There are 
many proxy signature schemes available in the literature to delegate signing capabilities [46 - 
48]. The signer generates a signed warrant which holds the information about the capability of 
the proxy entity and other required information. To deliver this signed warrant to proxy entity 
securely requires the presence of a secure channel. However, Jung-Yeun Lee et al, have 
proven in [47] that Kim, Park and Won (KPW) scheme does not require presence of secure 
channel to transmit the proxy warrant generated by signer. For design of ESKTS, we have used 
KPW because it is assumed basis of providing way to transfer proxy signatures without 
presence of secure channel and also provides a way to generate a chain of proxy signatures to 
delegate signing capabilities to a chain of proxy entities.
KPW provides way to generate, transfer and verify the proxy signatures without presence of 
secure channel. Here we summaries the working of KPW proxy signatures scheme while a 
detailed discussion on KPW scheme can be found in [46, 47]. Given p a large prime number 
such that 2^“ < p < 2^ ^^ , q is a large prime with qlp -1 and g is a generator of a multiplicative 
subgroup of Z*p with order q. h() is a collision resistant hash function. The signer has the key 
pair (X a, Ya (= gxA mod p)) and w^ represents the warrant signed by signer private key which 
contains the information about capabilities and life time etc. There can be any message to be 
signed say m. In KPW, a signer A chooses kA belongs to Z \  and computes Ra = g ^  mod p and 
Sa = kA + Xa. h(Wm, rA) mode q and then sends (Wm, rA, Sa) to proxy signer B. The recipient B 
can verify the validity of signature on warrant w^ and if it is valid, B can generate the proxy 
key pair (X b ,Y b)- B can use this key pair private key to generate the signature S b on the 
received message m. B can now send the (sb, m, Wm, rA) to any third person C. C can verify the 
proxy signatures on message m with warrant w^ by using the proxy public key.
The complete discussion that KPW proxy signatures can be transferred without using secure 
channel is given in [46-48]. ESKTS uses KPW security primitives to build the key transport 
protocol for DTN.
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5.1.3 Key Transport based on Public Key Cryptography
Key transport is the mechanism to transfer the key generated at one node A to other node B 
which can be used for later secure communications. Public key cryptography has made key 
exchange simple. By using the private key of the sender to sign the message which can be 
verified at destination and using public key of destination the sender can encrypt the 
symmetric key which can be decrypted by destination. While using the simplified key 
management benefits, the system has to pay more computational cost in signature generation 
/verification and encryption/decryption operations [45].
In DTN bandwidth is very important resource because of the facts the communication link 
may be available for limited period of time or there can be high disruption. Therefore, to save 
the communication cost is extremely important while designing the security protocol for DTN 
even tolerating the computation cost [5]. ESKTS has utilized this feature of key transport 
mechanism based on public key cryptography while tolerating the high cost of signature 
generation and verifications and encryption/decryption of symmetric keys in this trade off.
5.2 Models
This section provides our system model, adversary model and design goals for ESKTS.
5.2.1 Network Model
The DTN network consists of a set of m mobile nodes with unique name N, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3... 
m. Each node in the network has a public key certificate associated with its unique name N;. In 
a particular communication, only the public key certificate Px of source X is trusted by the 
intermediate nodes and destination. The source x knows the public key Py of destination Y and 
believes it is associated with destination Y. We also assume that nodes in the network have 
limited communication range so two nodes outside of the communication range of each other 
can only communicate by the participation of other nodes in a multi-hop manner. The end-to- 
end connectivity is not always present so routing is done in an opportunistic way.
5.2.2 Adversary Model
We assume that an adversary can listen to messages, change a message or can create new 
messages. We assume that adversary goal is to inject bogus messages inside the network, to 
deceive the protocol participants nodes in the network and to gain unauthorised access to the 
DTN resources. However, adversary should not be able to compromise any protocol
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participant node so all intermediate participating nodes will always forward the received 
bundle in order to complete the protocol.
5.2.3 Design Goals
5.2.3.1 Security Goals
The security goals are: to transport a locally generated secret key to the destination in a secure 
manner achieving the confidentiality, integrity, authentication and freshness. The identification 
and filtering of the bogus messages injected by external attackers is required by following the 
Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) architecture.
The Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) is designed in accordance with store-and-forward 
architecture of bundle protocol, so all the key exchange protocols should follow the BSP 
mechanism to provide hop-by-hop integrity and authentication and end-to-end confidentiality, 
integrity and authentication.
5.2.3.2 Efficiency
We also focus on reducing the number of communication rounds to achieve the 
communication efficiency to cope with the resource constrained nature of DTN.
5.3 Proposed Scheme
In this section we first describe our proposed key transport scheme ESKTS in detail along with 
the design algorithm, later we perform the security analysis of our proposed scheme and define 
the way to identify the bogus inserted messages and filter them. In the end, we perform the 
efficiency evaluation of our proposed scheme by simulation.
5.3.1 The ESKTS Scheme
The basic idea of ESKTS comes from public key cryptography based key transport 
mechanism. Key Transport is very suitable for DTN as an end node can create a symmetric 
key and can transfer it to other communicating party. The only problem was to support the 
hop-by-hop mechanism of authentication provided by BSP. This hop-by-hop authentication 
provision came from the proxy signatures and KPW which defines a way to transfer proxy 
signatures even without presence of secure channel. In DTN, intermediate nodes are also 
involved in the end-to-end communication to provide security services like hop-by-hop
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authentication. We now describe ESKTS with respect to participating nodes. Table 5-1 
summarises the notations which will be used to describe ESKTS throughout this chapter.
A Source entity A.
B Destination entity B,
C Any intermediate entity C.
Kab Symmetric key.
PrA» Pa Private and Public key pair of entity A.
PPrc, PPc Proxy Private and Public key pair of entity C.
p a r a m s x p w Parameters of KPW scheme for proxy signatures.
K P W (W m , Ta , Sa ) Proxy signatures parameters generation function.
EkabC^ ) Symmetric key encryption of data d with symmetric key.
D e c K A B (d ) Symmetric key decryption of data d using symmetric key.
Epb(Kab) Public key encryption of key using public key of entity B.
EpfbCKab) Public key decryption of key using private key of entity B.
S ig n p R A (h ) Digital signatures of data d generated by entity A.
VerifypA(h) Digital signatures verification function by using public key of A.
GenPKP(xi ... x j Proxy public/private key generation function provided xi ... x„ 
input parameters.
Table 5-1: Summary of notations for ESKTS 
a. Processing at Source Node
System Parameters: The source A creates a symmetric key Kab for encrypting the data to 
be sent in communication with destination B. Given a symmetric key generation function 
Kab = f(md), key can be generated by A. The proxy signatures triple (w^, ta, Sa) is 
generated using function paramsxpw = KPW(Wm, rA, Sa). The symmetric key Kab is 
encrypted along with A identity and time stamp T, K’ = Epb(Kab, A, Ta). The encrypted 
K’ is also signed for integrity and authentication by using SignpRA(K’). Data (d) can also 
be encrypted by using symmetric key Kab. EKAB(d). to be sent in communication. The
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message to be sent to intermediate node C is first encapsulated in bundle according to rules 
given in “Bundle Protocol (BP)” and “Bundle Security Protocol” (BSP) specifications. A 
general formatted message m to be sent to intermediate node C is given below:
m = E pb(K ab> a , T a), SignpRA(EpB(KAB, A, T a)), KPW(Wm, Sa), ExAB(d).
• Bundle Generation; The sender can generate the Bundle M according to BP and BSP 
specifications. The bundle will contain all the necessary blocks as specified by BP and 
BSP however the security blocks important parameters for encapsulation can be as 
follows:
o The PCB block shall contain Epb(Kab, A, Ta) and EKAa(d) to be only accessible at 
destination. The PIB can be generated with SignpRA(EpB(KAB, A, Ta)) information 
for integrity and authentication provision at destination. For generation of BAB, 
SignpRA(EpB(KAB, A, T a)), KPW(Wm, rA, Sa) can be used. The SigUpRA(EpB(KAB, A, 
Ta)) will be same for encapsulation in BAB and PIB at source A as no proxy 
signatures are available yet.
• Bundle Forwarding; The bundle M is forwarded to the next available hop.
A C ’ { E pb(K ab, a . T a), SignpRA(EpB(KAB, A, T a)), KPW(Wm, rA, Sa), Ei^B(d) )
b. Processing at Intermediate Nodes
• Signature Verification; The recipient of the bundle will verify the signatures of the 
previous hop available in BAB for integrity validation and authentication by using 
VerifypA(SignpRA(EpB(KAB, A, T a)), KPW(Wm, rA, Sa)).
• Proxy Public/Private Key Pair and Proxy W arrant Generation; The intermediate 
nodes C has to generate the new BAB. C will generate the local public/private key pair 
(PPrc, PPc) with the help of proxy signatures triple of KPW (w^, Ta, Sa). This private key 
PPrc can be used to sign the received message Signpprc(EpB(KAB, A, Ta) for authentication 
at next hop.
C can generate a proxy signature triple for next intermediate node KPW (Wm’, rA% Sa’)- B 
will include the information about the original message, the warrant Wm’, and the new 
computed values like rA% Sa’.
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• Bundle Generation; The bundle M shall be appended with new BAB by intermediate 
node C after removing the previous BAB. The new BAB will contain the new generated 
proxy signature information, locally generated public key.
• Bundle Forwarding; The bundle M is then forwarded to next available hop.
C ^  CjB'. ( E pb(K ab, a . T a), SignpRA(EpB(KAB, A, T a)), Signpprc(EpB(KAB, A, T a) , KPW
(Wm% Ta’, Sa’), EKAB(d) )
The next hop will be either any other intermediate node C or destination B. In case of any 
other intermediate node C as next hop, the all processing steps given in “Processing at 
Intermediate Nodes” will be repeated.
c. Processing At Destination
• Signature Verification; The destination B will verify the signatures in BAB for the 
authentication of previous hop and data integrity by using VerifypA(Signpprc(EpB(KAB, A, 
T a), KPW (Wm’, rA’, Sa’)). B will follow the BSP rules and will verify the originator 
signatures in PIB for end-to-end authentication and integrity by using 
VerifypA(SignpRA(EpB(KAB» A, T a))).
• Retrieving the Symmetric Key and Original Data; The symmetric key Kab can be
retrieved from the destination PCB keying material information after decrypting it using 
EprB(EpB(KAB, A, Ta)). This retrieved key Kab can be used to decrypt the encrypted 
payload data by using DecKAB(d).
Note that all intermediate nodes in the communication path have received the proxy signatures 
authority which they can use for later on communication until lifetime of those proxy 
signatures. The destination will also receive the symmetric session key Kab- Although same 
procedure as described above can be followed for each subsequent communication but 
computation efficiency can be achieved by not generating the new keying material every time 
for same communication channel.
5.3.2 Design of Proposed Scheme ESKTS
This section presents the above described scheme ESKTS in the form of an automaton. The 
diagram assumes that A is source trying to send symmetric key Kab to destination B via 
intermediate node C. There can be n >= 0 intermediate nodes on the path.
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Figure 5-1: Design of ESKTS Scheme
5.4 Evaluation of ESKTS
5.4.1 Security
In security design considerations we emphasize the protocol to be resistant to eavesdropping, 
replay attacks and to filter the altered or injected bogus messages. The large number of bogus 
messages insertion can lead to DoS attack. Our focus is here on security with respect to 
symmetric key transport mechanism only.
The major task in key transport protocol ESKTS is to transfer the key to destination B and no 
other party in between can gain access to encryption key. To prevent the users other than B to 
gain access to symmetric key Kab, we have encrypted it using the public key Pb of destination 
B. As the private key PrB is only accessible by destination B, so only B will be able to decrypt 
the session key Kab encrypted using the public key Pb. Once key Kab is accessible by 
destination B, it can use the symmetric key Kab to decrypt the payload data. The encryption 
can be done by using any algorithm of choice by the end users. The confidentiality of the 
symmetric key is ensured using the encryption mechanism and the key Kab delivered to 
destination B in a secure manner.
The session key Kab transmitted in ESKTS can be subject to cryptanalysis and stored by the 
malicious user. The malicious user can later on send the same encrypted and signed bundle to
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make same old session key available for communication with A. Because malicious user 
knows the key, so any data encrypted with thait session key can easily be read by the malicious 
user. To avoid this kind of attack, the time stamp is also sent along with encrypted key. The 
destination B can read the time stamp T and can identify that this bundle is an old bundle and 
is replayed. The bundle can be easily filtered by destination B, once it is identified as described 
above.
Preventing the malicious users from consuming the DTN scarce resources is critical 
consideration. The network bandwidth can be consumed easily by malicious nodes to inject 
bogus messages. The message in transit can also be altered in the network and when it reaches 
the destination, this message is of no use. To defend against these attacks (altering message, 
injection of bogus messages), it is required to verify the integrity of received message and 
authenticate that whether it is coming from the right source. In DTN, the integrity of messages 
is needed to be proven at each hop as well as on end-to-end basis. Because an intermediate 
node can buffer the bundle until the next link is available, so it is very important to identify 
such bogus messages at first and filter them. ESKTS tries to identify any altered or bogus 
messages by verifying the signatures and hash present in BAB for hop-by-hop integrity and 
authentication. On hop-by-hop this mechanism is provided by using the public key of 
originator or the proxy public key of the intermediate node. ESKTS also provides facilities to 
end nodes as well to verify the integrity of received message and authenticate the originator. 
By using mechanisms defined in ESKTS, any bogus or altered message can be easily identified 
on any earliest security enabled DTN node and can be filtered at the earliest opportunity.
5.4.2 Compliance with Bundle Security Protocol
DTN provides store-and-forward kind of service in environments where delays are very large 
or in presence of high disruption by using Bundle protocol. The provision of security for DTN 
has been a major consideration for DTN community. The motivating security goals for DTN 
networks were denial of service attacks, resource consumption and providing confidentiality 
for end-to-end communication as well. Bundle Security Protocol BSP, is designed to prevent 
such attacks. It is a general framework to provide security primitives of integrity, 
authentication and confidentiality on hop-by-hop and end-to-end basis to be in compliance 
with DTN store-and-forward communication and achieving security goals while some security 
services are yet to be provided. It is very important for new security protocols to be compliant 
with BSP to work under DTN environment.
ESKTS supports BSP architecture by checking the integrity of the symmetric key being 
transmitted on hop-by-hop and end-to-end basis. In ESKTS, the signatures are created by using
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the global private key at originator and locally generated private key at each security 
participating intermediate node. The originator signatures are verified at first intermediate 
node and destination. The public key also helps in verifying the warrant of proxy signatures at 
each intermediate node to authenticate the proxy signing entities as well. The all keying 
material including symmetric key and proxy signatures are also transmitted as part of 
designated blocks of BAB, PEB and PCB. The proposed ESKTS scheme is in total compliance 
with BSP and can be easily used for DTN secure communications without requiring any 
modification to existing BSP protocol.
In summary, ESKTS is analysed as a secure scheme against the selected security design 
objectives. The next section analyses the ESKTS practicability in DTN environment via 
simulations.
5.4.3 Simulations and Performance Evaluation
5.4.3.1 Cryptographic Overhead Calculations
ESKTS involve many security operations e.g. encryption/decryption, signatures etc. To 
investigate the performance of ESKTS, we first study the execution time of the cryptographic 
operations involved in ESKTS. In the scheme, the major operations are key and data 
encryption, signing the key and verification of these signatures. The other operation involved 
was proxy public/private key pair generation and proxy signatures verification. For the proxy 
signatures operations, we have also used RSA and DSA standard algorithms. For the 
evaluation of delay of cryptographic operations, the used machine specifications are given 
below in table 5-2.
Laptop X86, 32 bit
Processor Intel Core Duo CPU, @2.40 GHz, @2.40 GHz
RAM 2 GB
OS Windows 7
JDK Version 1.6
Table 5-2: Summary of Specifications of Machine
On the selected machine, we implemented all the security operations involved in ESKTS and 
calculated their execution time. We run the programs for 10 times and average the results. The 
execution time results for different selected operations and algorithms are presented in below 
table 5-3.
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Cryptographic
Algorithm
Key Size Operation Average Execution 
Time
Standard 
Deviation of 
Execution 
Time
RSA or DSA 1024 Key Pair 
Generation
0.4454 seconds 0.1483 seconds
MD5 with RSA 1024 Sign 0.0903 seconds 0.0029 seconds
MD5 with RSA 1024 Verify 0.0503 seconds 0.0022 seconds
SHAl with DSA 1024 Sign 0.104 seconds 0.0042 seconds
SHAl with DSA 1024 Verify 0.127 seconds 0.0126 seconds
RSA 1024 Encrypt 0.7101 seconds 0.049 seconds
RSA 1024 Decrypt 0.0093 seconds 0.0008 seconds
AES-ECB 128 Encrypt 0.2204 seconds 0.032 seconds
AES-ECB 128 Decrypt 0.1758 seconds 0.054 seconds
Table 5-3: Details of Execution Time of Cryptographic Operations
As public key operation, digital signatures, was the major operation happening on each node, 
we have used evaluated two variations of digital signatures by using RSA and DSA 
algorithms. It is observed that RSA signing operation time 0.0903 seconds is more costly as 
compared to RSA signatures verification operation execution time of 0.0503 seconds. In case 
of DSA, the signatures verification operation takes more execution time (0.127 seconds) as 
compared to DSA signing operation time (0.104 seconds). However, overall DSA based 
singing and verification operations are more costly as compared to RSA signing and 
verification operations.
After determining the cryptographic overhead in terms of computation cost, we evaluate the 
performance of ESKTS by implementing the ESKTS in ONE simulator on a “Spray and Wait” 
routing protocol. The details of simulations and analysis are given below:
5.4 3.2 Simulation
In this section, we evaluated the performance of ESKTS by simulations. The detailed 
simulation environment is first described followed by the simulations results and evaluation.
• Simulation Setup:
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ESKTS scheme was implemented on Opportunistic Networking Environment (ONE) simulator 
[49, 50] specially designed for DTN and evaluated its performance on a selected scenario 
based on vehicular networks. The average speed of vehicles varies from 10 km/hr to 70 km/hr 
(suitable for urban environments) and transmission coverage of cars was set to 100m. To make 
the environment realistic, a map of real city (Helsinki) was extracted for the study and map 
based movement was selected for simulation. The vehicles move towards randomly selected 
positions on the map. The details of simulations parameters are summarised in the table 5-4.
Parameter Value Range
Duration 12 Hours
Number of Nodes Variable
Speed of Nodes 10 km/hr to 70 km/hr
Transmission Coverage 100 Meters
Mobility Model Map based Mobility
Message Size 5 MB
Message Generation Interval 25s -  35s
Routing Protocol Spray and Wait Protocol
Number of Forwarding Copies Variable
Table 5-4: Parameters for ESKTS Simulation
Based on the parameters described above, ESKTS was implemented on “Spray and Wait 
(SW)” binary mode routing protocol. The SW routing protocol is a deterministic and multi­
copy protocol which achieves high delivery ratio while utilizes very low resources. In its 
working, the source starts by transmitting L copies to its neighbours. The receiver of these 
transmitted copies then forwards L/2 copies to the first node they encounter. Each of the nodes 
receiving a message copy of L/2 transmitted messages will forward the half of the number of 
total messages L to the node not having a copy of that message and which they will encounter. 
In this way the message will be delivered to the destination after repeated process of 
distributing message copies. So multiple copies of message relayed, in the network for 
delivering a single message to the destination, is considered message overhead in SW protocol 
[51]. Because, it is deterministic protocol and number of forwarding copies can be controlled 
which is why we have selected this for simulations. The ESKTS can be implemented on any 
other routing protocol for DTN as well.
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For evaluation of ESKTS performance for selected scenario, we compared the simulation 
performance when results were obtained in presence of security processing with the simulation 
results obtained when no security operations were done and simulation was only affected by 
the networking parameters. For our selected scenario the system performance, when no 
security operations are applied, is benchmark for results comparison. The network metrics 
selected for evaluation of system performance are given below:
•  Delivery Ratio = (M essages D elivered/ M essagesRelayed),
•  M essages Overhead Ratio = (M essages Relayed in w hole network -  M essages 
Delivered to  destinations) /  M essages Delivered to destinations,
• Average Latency = Average (Time at which M essage Delivered -  Time at which 
M essage Created).
5.4.3.3 Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies
To evaluate the practicability of ESKTS, we firstly examined the system performance under 
different network traffic conditions. Multi copy forwarding is a major characteristic of DTN 
routing protocols. For this analysis, we fixed the number of deployed nodes to 250 for the 
selected city map. The SW routing protocol number of forwarding copies were changed from 
1.2% to 12% of total deployed nodes. The number of forwarding copies variation took into 
consideration the recommendations of SW routing protocol paper [51]. Figures 5-2, 5-3 and 5- 
4 show system performance of original routing protocol SW without any ESKTS security 
operations, SW routing protocol with ESKTS with cryptographic algorithms AES-ECB, 
MD5withRSA, RSA and SW routing protocol with ESKTS with cryptographic algorithms 
AES-ECB, SHAlwithDSA, RSA. The network performance can be measured in terms of three 
traditional metrics: successful delivery ratio, average latency and overhead ratio.
Figure 5-2 shows the relationship between delivery ratios of number of forwarding copies. It is 
observed that successful delivery ratio grows fast with increase in number of copies. The 
delivery ratio increases till a specific threshold (for example, 15, 18 in figure 5-2) and starts 
decreasing as we increase the number of copies. This shows that delivery ratio is highest at 
some optimal number of forwarding copies and once number of forwarding copies increases 
that threshold the delivery ratio starts decreasing as traffic becomes higher than the optimal 
capacity of network system.
However, it can also be observed that security computation overhead degrades the SW 
performance. The figure 5-2 clearly shows that when number of forwarding copies is low in 
number, the different between SW performance with and without ESKTS security is very
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close. The degradation in performance with ESKTS security can go up to 10% of the 
performance of original SW routing protocol at highest number of forwarding copies equal to 
30. However, when the system performance of SW is at highest delivery ratios the degradation 
in system performance with ESKTS security is 5% of SW delivery ratio. It is also observed 
that ESKTS performance when MD5withRSA is used as digital signatures algorithm is more 
close to SW without ESKTS performance compared to ESKTS performance when 
SHAlwithDSA digital signatures algorithm is used. However, at the optimal point of system 
performance, the difference between SW without security and with security is not very 
significant and that should be the major configuration used for a real deployed system.
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Figure 5-2: Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies: Deliver Ratio
Figure 5-3 demonstrates that ESKTS with security has slightly larger overhead as compared to 
SW without security. However, the overhead in ESKTS-with-DSA and ESKTS-with-RSA are 
almost identical and slightly larger overhead when compared to without security. But, the 
overhead ratio is not significantly different and thus they all have same performance in case of 
overhead ratio.
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Figure 5-3: Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies: Overhead Ratio
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From figure 5-4, it can be observed that average latency is decreased while overhead increased 
along with the number of forwarding copies which is compliant with successful delivery ratio. 
Similarly, here the average latency for SW without security and SW with security is not 
significantly different and all the simulations have demonstrated same performance in terms of 
average latency.
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Figure 5-4: Impact of Number of Forwarding Copies: Average Latency
S.4.3.4 Impact of Network Scalability
To evaluate the practicability of ESKTS, we also examined the system performance under 
different network sizes. We scale the network from sparsely deployed nodes (50 nodes) to 
densely deployed nodes (300 nodes) and observe the network performance parameters. The 
SW routing protocol number of forwarding copies were set to 10% of deployed nodes as 
recommended by [51]. Figures 5-5, 5-6, 5-7 show system performance of original SW protocol 
without any ESKTS scheme, SW with ESKTS scheme with RSA digital signatures algorithm 
and SW with ESKTS scheme with DSA as digital signatures algorithm. For encryption 
operations, RSA and AES-ECB were chosen for all ESKTS simulation scenarios.
Figure 5-5 shows the delivery ratio for different network sizes. It is clear from the picture that 
when nodes are densely deployed the delivery ratio is higher due to increased probability to 
find a contact to forward the bundle although SW number of forwarding copies is set to same 
percentage (10%) of deployed nodes in all configurations. It is observed that when network 
size is changed, the performance of ESKTS in presence of security is very close to SW 
performance without security. However, there is a 9.75% performance degradation in ESKTS 
with DSA security compared to SW without security performance in very densely deployed 
network configuration. This behaviour is almost same to the behaviour observed in the traffic 
load analysis when number of forwarding copies of SW routing protocol are increased. The 
performance degradation in optimal configurations of number of forwarding copies scenario
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was 5% and when all optimal configurations for different network sizes is simulated, the 
perfonuance degradation has increased to 10% for very densely deployed networks.
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Figure 5-5: Impact of Network Scalability: Delivery Ratio
Figure 5-6 demonstrates that ESKTS with security has slightly larger overhead as compared to 
SW without security. The overhead ratio for densely deployed nodes is slightly more in 
ESKTS with security simulations as compared to SW without security simulations. However, 
the overhead in ESKTS-with-DSA and ESKTS-with-RSA are almost identical and slightly 
larger overhead when compared to without security.
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Figure 5-6: Impact of Network Scalability: Overhead Ratio
From figure 5-7, it can be observed that average latency is increased while the deployed nodes 
in the network are increased. Here the average latency for SW without security and SW with 
security is not significantly different and all the simulations have demonstrated same 
performance in terms of average latency.
86
Chapter 5: ESKTS
600
500
Z  300bO
2 200
<  100
200 250 30050 100 150
•W ithout-Security
•ESKTS-AES_ECB-
MD5withRSA-RSA
ESKTS-AES_ECB-
SHAlwithDSA-RSA
Number of Deployed Nodes
Figure 5-7: Impact of Network Scalability: Average Latency
In summary, we can say that above simulation results have demonstrated that ESKTS is indeed 
a viable and lightweight solution for transporting the symmetric keys securely in DTN 
environment. ESKTS can be used as a way to exchange keys between communicating parties 
in compliance with DTN security architecture,
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, ESKTS, a suitable key transport scheme based public key cryptography and 
proxy signatures, is presented in detail along with its design and security and performance 
evaluation via simulations. To achieve the compliance with the BSP, ESKTS uses KPW proxy 
signatures to delegate restricted signatures rights to remote intermediate nodes and achieves 
hop-by-hop integrity and authentication. At the end, security evaluation and performance 
evaluation of ESKTS are discussed according to design goals.
The next chapter discusses the issue of public key certificates validation and revocation 
mechanism for DTN.
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6 A Suitable PKI Validation and Revocation 
Method for DTN
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is based on public key certificates and is most widely used 
mechanism for public key management. The security protocols defined for DTN including the 
BSP is designed on the assumption that some sort of public key management mechanism is 
there to support security functions. The current BSP has provided a mechanism to prevent the 
unauthorized access and utilization of DTN resources while also maintaining the end-to-end 
confidentiality by introducing different security blocks appended with actual payload. As 
described earlier, these are BAB, PIE to provide hop-by-hop and end-to-end integrity and 
authentication and PCB to provide end-to-end confidentiality. The provision of all these 
security features is dependent upon cryptographic keys and BSP assumes presence of keys on 
all the intermediate and end nodes.
However DTN characteristics, intermittent-connectivity, long delays and limited storage space 
at intermediate nodes, make the PKI unsuitable for DTN due to the validation of certificates 
from online CA. In the DTN community, DTN key management is still an open issue and PKI 
validation and revocation mechanism is considered as the root problem for suitability of PKI 
for DTN [35 - 44].
PKI uses two standard mechanisms. Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL), for validation and revocation of certificates. OCSP is a request 
response based mechanism to check the status of the certificates while CRL is a list of revoked 
certificates, issued periodically and distributed publicly, usually in central repository. OCSP is 
an online status checking protocol in which the status validation entity is always online to 
respond to the status checking queries. Although as compared to CRL, OCSP provides fresh 
status information but the request response model may not be very suitable for DTN as link 
may not be available all the times. In DTN an offline mechanism such that CRL may be 
suitable for revocation and validation of certificates [54 -  56].
As DTN “Store-and-forward” characteristics require the bundles to be stored at intermediate 
nodes, in case of no communication link is present or in case of high disruption, bundles can 
be forwarded by these intermediate nodes. While distributing the CRL, this “store-and- 
forward” characteristic of DTN also requires CRL to be stored at intermediate nodes until the
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next link becomes available. At each intermediate node it is required that CRL signature 
should be verified and CA certificate should also be validated. The verification and validation 
of CA certificate is also a challenge. A simple list of revoked certificates may also require 
searching through list at intermediate nodes which may not be very efficient solution in large 
DTN networks where the link is needed to be scanned multiple times. So, there is a 
requirement to increase the efficiency of searching through the list. Our proposed scheme 
provides a way to arrange the revocation list in the form of tree data structure to increase the 
searching efficiency. It also makes the intermediate nodes to easily verify that CRL is coming 
from the right CA.
In this chapter, we review the basics of PKI including existing validation mechanisms, then we 
highlight the validation problems and then we describe our proposed validation and revocation 
mechanism to provide basics for practical public key management for DTN.
6.1 Preliminaries
6.1.1 Public Key Infrastructure
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is an infrastructure to manage the digital certificates. PKI 
provides mechanisms to generate, store, distribute and revoke the digital certificates which are 
means to associate the public key to a specific entity signed by a certificate authority (CA). A 
certificate authority is a trusted entity in the network which is responsible for issuing 
certificates. There can be different levels of CAs to issue certificates to different entities. There 
is one Root CA to issue certificates to itself and other sub ordinate CAs who can issue 
certificates to other CAs or end entities.
Once a certificate is issued, a copy is stored in the CA database and a copy can be given to the 
entity registering the public key. The certificate registration is usually done via a registration 
authority called RA which can be a government registration authority holding the data about 
all people, entities in the country. After registration a certificate is issued to some entity and a 
trust is built. In a communication, an entity can present this certificate to other entity as a proof 
that the public key belongs to the presenting entity. However, the trust between CA and end 
entity or Root CA and sub ordinate CA can be broken by many means e.g. .due to violating 
any terms of contract, private key is compromised etc. In that case, the issued certificate is 
needed to be revoked and a new certificate is issued upon request. So, any party A 
participating in a secure communication, if wants to use the public key of other party B, then
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the certificate of B is required to be validated by the issuing authority. This process ensures 
that certificate is still valid and belongs to B. This process is called certificate validation.
Due to resource scarcity in DTN especially bandwidth, communication efficiency represents a 
critical problem for security protocols design. Using the PKI for DTN networks is not suitable 
due to its validation mechanism as in every communication the certificate is needed to be 
validated and then can be usable for selected period of time. Using the PKI for key 
management in DTN can be feasible if a suitable certificate validation mechanism can be 
designed. This motivates us to design a certificate validation mechanism which is suitable for 
DTN [59, 60].
6.1.2 Certificate Revocation and Validation Mechanisms
The standard revocation methods being used in PKI are “Certificate Revocation List” (CRL) 
and “Online Certificate Status Protocol” (OCSP). We briefly describe them below:
6.1.2.1 Certificate Revocation List
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is issued periodically. A CRL essentially consists of a CA- 
signed list containing all the serial numbers of the revoked certificates. The digital certificate 
presented with an electronic transaction is then compared to the most recent CRL. If the given 
certificate is not expired but is on the list, then everyone knows from the CRL that the 
certificate is not valid and the certificate holder is no longer authorized to conduct the 
transaction. Else, if the certificate does not appear in the CRL, then the certificate is deduced to 
be valid (a double negative) [54].
6.1.2.2 Online Certificate Status Protocol
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a request response based mechanism to check the 
status of the certificates. In the OCSP, a CA answers a query about a certificate C by returning 
its own digital signature of C's validity status at the current time. After the verification of CA’s 
signatures as trusted body, the certificate is accepted as a valid certificate. [55, 56]
In DTN, we know link may not be available and disruption is high and communicating parties
use store and forward based mechanism to give good performance in these kinds of
environments. OCSP is an online status checking protocol in which the status validation entity
is always online to respond to the status checking queries. When an entity sends a request to
check the status of a selected certificate, the responder checks the database and sends the status
response signed by its own private key. Although as compared to CRL, OCSP provides fresh
status information but the request response modal may not be very suitable for DTN as link
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may not be available all the times. So, an offline mechanism will be more suitable for DTN, 
when the status of certificate is updated after specified period of time. CRL is an offline 
mechanism in which the revoked certificate status list is populated and distributed in the 
network. But, as CRL grows, it becomes very difficult to manage. In DTN, because 
intermediate nodes buffer the bundle until the next link is available so storing a huge CRL may 
be not feasible for their working.
In DTN, an offline mechanism such that CRL can be useful if the CRL size is manageable at 
intermediate nodes and can be distributed efficiently in DTN high disruption or long delays 
environments. In the below section, we shall review the research efforts done to reduce the size 
of CRL and then propose our mechanism which reduces the CRL size, provides mechanism to 
search through CRL in computationally efficient way. In our best knowledge, this is first effort 
to address DTN validation mechanism especially efficient, reduced size CRL distribution.
6.1.3 Hash Chain
A hash is a fixed length, unique value which is produced by using a special function called 
cryptographic hash function h(x) where x is an arbitrary selected value. A hash function is 
called one way function as it is computationally infeasible to generate the original value from 
the hash value. A hash chain is a list of many hashes by applying the hash function h(x) 
multiple times. An arbitrary value x is selected and hash function h(x) generates hash value hi. 
Then h2 can be produced by applying the hash function h(x) on hi. Similarly hash function 
can be applied repeatedly to generate a chain of hashes up to a length of choice. Because of the 
power of hash it shall not be feasible to generate hi from the h2. [57].
6.1.4 NOVOMODO: Scalable Certificate Validation and Simplified PKI 
Management
NOVOMODO is a validation mechanism based on X.509 V3 certificates and it works like 
OCSP request response model. NOVOMODO introduces the concept of time granularity for 
which the certificate is considered to be valid and is different from certificate expiry date. 
NOVOMODO appends two 20 bytes hashes with the certificate. It also breaks the total time 
span between certificate issuance and expiry time into smaller units. That smaller unit is the 
time period for which the certificate must remain valid. It is proposed in NOVOMODO that 
generate the chain of hash functions equal to the selected time units for certificate expiry date. 
Let’s say a certificate is valid for one year (365 days) and time granularity is selected to be 1 
day. According to NOVOMODO, a hash chain of 365 hashes (XO, X2...X364) is needed to be
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calculated from a randomly selected 20 byte value known only to server. The last calculated 
hash X365 is appended in the V3 certificate before issuing to any entity. NOVOMODO also 
adds one more hash Ylin the X.509 V3 Certificate which is calculated from another randomly 
selected value YO. Now suppose an entity on i-th day send a request to validate the certificate 
Ca to the CA. The CA has to make decision based on the data from its local database. If the 
certificate is valid, CA will select the i-th hash value Xi and append it with the certificate serial 
number and sends this as a response to certificate status checking request. If the certificate was 
revoked, then the issuing CA would have selected the YO and would have sent it along with 
the serial number. The receiving entity can use the Xi and produce the Xi+1 [60, 61].
6.1.5 Heap, a Data Structure
A heap is a tree based data structure in which the root and leaf nodes in the tree have some 
kind of comparison relationship. There are two kinds of heap called Max heap and Min heap. 
In max heap if node B is child node of A, then key (A) >= key (B). So, in max heap the root 
node in the tree has the highest value and in min heap the root node has the lowest value in the 
tree. An example of min heap is shown in below figure 6-1.
12 14
Figure 6-1: An example of Min Heap
The heap data structure is very efficient with following computational complexity for different 
operations [62].
Operation Complexity
Insert 0  (log (n))
Search 0 (1 )
Delete 0  (log (n))
Table 6-1: Complexity Analysis of Heap Data Structure
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6.2 Design Goals
The design goals are straightforward: to distribute CRL in DTN network in a way that is 
compliant with bundle security protocol and it should be efficient in terms of searching 
through the list. The compliance with bundle security protocol means that CRL should be 
authenticated at each intermediate node that it is sent from a valid CA. As CRL information is 
public it is not required to encrypt to achieve end-to-end confidentiality. The security goals for 
CRL distribution are that CRL entries should not be forged and it should be always ensured 
that CRL is issued from a valid CA before forwarding in the network. As DTN resources 
especially bandwidth are very scarce, we also focus on filtering any bogus messages injected 
into the network.
6.3 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme in detail.
6.3.1 Network Model
We consider a DTN network formed by a set of mobile nodes with unique name N, for i = 0, 1, 
2, 3... m. Each node in the network has a public key certificate based on NOVOMODO 
associated with its unique name Ni issued by a CA. Each node also knows the algorithm used 
by CA to compute the hashes for validity and revocation proofs. In a particular 
communication, only the public key certificate of CA is known by all nodes in the network and 
isvalidated at each node when required. We also assume that the CA receives its validity proof 
hash for its certificate from its issuer according to selected granularity period. It is always 
assumed that CA cannot be compromised for the whole life of description of the system. We 
also assume that nodes in the network have limited communication range so two nodes outside 
of the communication range of each other can only communicate by the participation of other 
nodes in a multi-hop manner. The end-to-end connectivity is not always present so routing is 
done in an opportunistic way.
6.3.2 System Initialization
In initialization phase the CAs and end entities are issued with the certificates. The issued 
certificate in X.509 version 3.0, contains different information including the public key 
associated with certificate, serial number, name of subject, expiry date etc. The X.509 V3 
certificates provide the facility to include any other information as extension. In DTN different
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applications may want the certificate to be valid for different minimal period of time 
depending on security requirements. Suppose the certificate issued are valid for 100 days and 
application specific selected minimal period T for which a certificate must be valid is 1 day 
(granularity period). The granularity period is totally designer decision and is dependent upon 
the system requirements. The granularity period can be setup according to the application 
delay requirements. It is very suitable for DTN environment, as depending upon the 
delay/disruption for a selected scenario, the granularity period for the validity of certificate can 
be set up from seconds to months. This flexibility of setting up granularity period as per 
requirement makes this Validation and revocation mechanism very suitable for DTN 
environment. In the example, we propose to produce a hash chain of 100 lengths for selected 
arbitrary value XO which corresponds to validation just like NOVOMODO. The hash chain 
generated will be XO, X2, X3 ... X99 by applying the hash function h(x) repeatedly.
The last item X99 of the hash chain is appended in the issued certificate as an extension. 
Another hash value called Y1 is also appended in the issued certificate which is generated 
from second arbitrary selected value YO. This second has is used to verify that a certificate is 
revoked. As Y1 will be included in the original certificate of end entity so any entity trying to 
verify the revocation status of a certificate will receive YO in CRL. The Y1 will be tried to 
calculate again from received YO and if new generated Y1 will match with Y1 present in the 
end entity certificate, then it will surely understood that certificate for this end entity is 
revoked. So, during system initialization all the issued certificates will contain two extra hash 
values Xi and Y1 as extension to the certificate. These hashes Xi and Y1 will help to validate 
the status of certificate later on. In the initialization phase, all nodes in the network can get 
their public key certificates from the CA of their own choice.
6.3.3 Certificate Validation and Revocation Method
6.3.3.1 CRL Generation and Distribution
We propose to build a certificate revocation list (CRL) of revoked certificates using heap data 
structure. The CRL will contain a heap built on the serial number of revoked certificates. As 
CRL is distributed periodically, the CA will build a CRL for its revoked members along with 
its certificate validity proof hash X; issued for selected granularity period and will distribute in 
the network.
When any node in the network receives the CRL, first it will validate the CA certificate by 
computing the hash in the original CA certificate from the hash X, received along with CRL 
according to granularity period. After successful verification of CA certificate, it is ensured
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that CRL is coming from right CA. Once CRL is verified that it is coming from CA that is 
claimed, the receiving node stores CRL in its persistent storage and then forwards it to other 
node according to routing algorithm, or receiving node forwards the CRL without storing it in 
its persistent storage. If CRL is stored in the persistent storage of the node, it can be used later 
on for certificate validation status checking by searching through the heap.
6.3.3.2 CRL Design
In this section, we describe the CRL design in detail. We describe the new CRL design with 
reference to X.509 CRL. The new CRL is designed to provide same information as X.509 
CRL provides but with fewer fields.
Figure 6-2 shows the fields which are present in a usual X.509 CRL. The X.509 CRL is 
constructed by setting signature algorithm Id, the issuer distinguished name (DN), this update 
field as well as next update field together with list of all revoked certificates and some 
mandatory extensions. The sequence up to extensions field is then signed and signature is 
appended to the CRL. The field, “Revoked Certificates”, is a complex field and contains list of 
revoked certificates. The further details on the revoked certificates field are shown in figure 6- 
3. As CRL grows, the huge size of CRL is dependent on this “Revoked Certificates” field. 
Each entry in “Revoked Certificates list consists of 39 bytes including a 6 bytes long serial 
number
Version Signature Issuer This Next Revoked Extensions Sig Signatures
Algorithm DN Update Update Certificates Alg Id
Figure 6-2: Original X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Serial Number Revocation Date Reason Code Data Structure
Information
Figure 6-3: Details of “Revoked Certificates” field from Original X.509 CRL
of revoked certificate, a 13 byte long entry for revocation date and a 12 bytes long entry for 
reason code [63]. The size of fixed fields in CRL has been measured to be 400 bytes. So, a 
total size of X.509 certificate can be calculated as follows:
Size of X.509 CRL = (Number of revoked certificates * 39 + 400) bytes
In parallel to this X.509 CRL, we propose a new CRL design shown in figure 6-4 based on 
NOVOMODO and is compliant with X.509 data structures. Each entry in this new CRL is of 
38 bytes compared to X.509 39 bytes entry but, there are no other fixed entry fields.
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Serial Number Reason Code Revocation Proof
Figure 6-4: Design of New Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
The new CRL is formed by a 6 bytes serial number of revoked certificate, a 12 bytes long 
reason code and a 20 bytes long field of revocation proof hash. Thus a new CRL built for same 
number of revoked certificates will be of smaller size as compared to X.509 CRL. The size of 
new CRL can be calculated as follows:
Size of new CRL = (Number of revoked certificates * 38) bytes
Although new CRL consists of fewer fields as compared to X.509 CRL, yet same information 
can be deduced from it as X.509 CRL provides. The signature algorithm and Issuer DN are not 
required to be included in new CRL since if the hash contained in the certificate can be 
computed from the hash available in the revocation proof field, then it is guaranteed that the 
proof is coming from the actual issuer and there is no need to sign the hash to prove the 
identity of CA. For more details on security analysis of hash and new CRL please see section 
6.4.3. In X.509 CRL, “This Update” and “Next Update” fields provides the dates on which the 
current CRL was issued and what is the next issuance date of new CRL while in new CRL 
there is no need to provide this information. The “This Update” and “Next Update” 
information can be deduced from the granularity period chosen at the time of certificate 
generation (please see section 6.3.2 for more details). The discussion on extensions to CRL is 
out of scope of this thesis. We have seen that design of new CRL is smaller as compared to 
X.509 CRL but, still it provides equivalent information as provided by X.509 CRL.
6.4 Evaluation of Proposed Method
This section focuses on evaluating the proposed new CRL on different scales according to the 
selected design goals. This section first describes the complexity analysis of CRL procedures 
and compares it with basic linear CRL operations followed by security evaluation of the 
proposed CRL method. At the end the simulations results, to analyse the practicality of new 
CRL method, are presented.
6.4.1 Complexity Analysis of Heap Based new CRL
This section analyses the complexity of heap based CRL. We build the new CRL by inserting 
the serial number of revoked certificates according to the rules of building the heap. We know 
that insertion operation complexity of heap is 0(log (n)) ( see section 6.1.5 for more details), 
searching operation complexity in heap is 0(1) and searching operation complexity through a
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simple sorted list is linear. If we can define functions for different operations complexities as, 
for building heap based CRL complexity of 0(log (n)) as f(x) = log (x), searching for a 
revoked certificate in heap based CRL complexity of 0(1) as f(x) =1 and for linear search in 
X.509 CRL as f(x) = x, then we can draw these functions behaviour on a graph whose x-axis, 
represents CRL size, and y-axis represents, execution time, are expanding as linear function as 
shown in the figure 6-5.
From figure 6-5, it is clear that as x value increases, the graph for f(x) = x will always increase 
in a constant fashion along with x while the f(x) =1 will always be constant and f(x) = log(x) 
will become very low as compared to linear growth of f(x) = x.
From the above analysis, it is obvious that new CRL searching operation is very fast and 
always constant independent of the size of CRL while the searching operation through a basic 
sorted list is always linear and will take longer as size of list will increase.
a
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x.509 CRL Linear Search; 
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Heap Based CRL Building;
F(x) = log(x)
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CRL Size
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Figure 6-5: Complexity Analysis of Heap based CRL
6.4.2 Compliance with X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
The new CRL is compliant with X.509 PKI standard thus should be easy to implement in real
scenarios. All the changes are in compliance with X.509 standards for certificates and CRL
and will not require so much modification to implement. Here we review all the modifications
proposed with reference to X.509 PKI standard.
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During the system initialization, two hashes each of 20 bytes are appended into the X.509 V3 
Certificates to get certificate validated and revoked later on (please see sections 6.1.4 and 6.3.2 
for more information). The addition of these hashes into X.509 V3 certificate is compliant 
with the PKI X.509 certificate specifications which allow adding any extensions to the 
certificate.
We have reduced the fields in the new CRL design as compared to X.509 CRL design. But, all 
the entries in the CRL are in compliance with X.509 specifications. So, new CRL can easily 
replace the old X.509 CRL without so many modifications in the implementation of the 
system.
6.4.3 Security
In security design considerations we emphasize that the proof of revocation cannot be forged 
when transmitted in the network and also it filter the altered or injected bogus CRL messages. 
It was also emphasized that new CRL design helps to achieve compliance with the BSP 
specifications. Here we analyze the new CRL with respect to set goals.
The invocation proof present in the new CRL cannot be forged. Because, invocation proof 
hash is reverse of certificate revocation field Y1 (see section 6.3.2 for more information). 
Because hash is practically impossible to invert, so once a verifier checks that a given 20 byte 
revocation proof hash can be computed by Y1, it knows that revocation proof must have been 
released from the actual CA. In fact, only the actual CA can compute the inverse of Y l, not 
due to the reason that CA can invert the Yl but because it computed Yl from a hash value YO 
when issuing the certificate. Because, the certificate issuing CA never releases the proof of 
revocation as long as the certificate remains valid, no malicious entity can fake a revocation 
proof. So a revocation can be publically distributed on an unsecure channel without worrying 
about that it can be forged.
The new CRL distribution in the DTN network is compliant with the BSP specifications as on 
each hop the original source (CA) certificate is validated and is authenticated which are the 
security design goals of the scheme. As described in section 6.3.3.1, the certificate of CA can 
be validated by re-computing the hash contained in the X.509 certificate according to 
granularity set by the system with the hash received along with CRL from the CA. If the hash 
can be re-computed then certificate is valid and as hash cannot be forged, so it is assumed that 
it is coming from the claimed CA. Otherwise, the CA certificate is considered invalid. In 
X.509 CRL to verify the validity of CA, a normal procedure of certificate validation will be 
required to follow which requires presence of online server and shall not be suitable for DTN.
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This validation process also helps to identify any forged list sent in to the network to spoil 
network resources. As, this list can be easily identified by checking the validity of CA 
certificate, so it can be filtered as soon as it is identified invalid and can save the DTN network 
bandwidth resources.
6.4.4 Simulations and Performance Evaluation
6.4.4.1 Cryptographic Overhead Calculations
x.509 CRL based and new CRL based Revocation and validation mechanisms involve many 
security operations at receiving nodes when CRL is distributed e.g. signature verification, hash 
computation etc. We only consider the cryptographic operations affecting the forwarder nodes 
performance. For the simulations, we did not consider the operations performed at CA, like 
signing the list, as they are not focus of study. To investigate the performance of revocation 
mechanisms, we first study the execution time of the cryptographic operations involved in its 
operation. For the evaluation of delay of cryptographic operations, the used machine 
specifications are given below in table 5-2.
Laptop X86, 32 bit
Processor Intel Core Duo CPU, @2.40 GHz, @2.40 GHz
RAM 2 GB
OS Windows 7
JDK Version 1.6
Table 6-2: Summary of Specifications of Machine
On the selected machine, we implemented all the security operations involved in revocation 
mechanisms and calculated their execution time. We run the programs for 10 times and 
average the results. The execution time results for different selected operations and algorithms 
are presented in below table 5-3.
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Key Size Operation Average Execution 
Time
Standard 
Deviation of 
Execution 
Time
MD5 with RSA 1024 Verify 0.0503 seconds 0.0022 seconds
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MD5 128 Bits Hash 0.0109 seconds 0.0033 seconds
(Hash Calculation
Length)
Table 6-3: Details of Execution Time of Cryptographic Operations
After determining the cryptographic overhead in terms of computation cost, we evaluate the 
performance of revocation mechanisms by implementing them in ONE simulator on a “Spray 
and Wait” routing protocol. The details of simulations and analysis are given below:
6.4.4.2 Simulations
In this section, we evaluated the performance of new CRL based revocation and validation 
mechanism by simulations. The detailed simulation environment is first described followed by 
the simulations results and evaluation.
6.4.4.2.1 Simulation Setup
The validation and revocation mechanism, based of new CRL design, was implemented on 
Opportunistic Networking Environment (ONE) simulator [49, 50] specially designed for DTN 
and evaluated its performance on a selected scenario based on vehicular networks. The average 
speed of vehicles varies from 10 km/hr to 70 km/hr and transmission coverage of cars was set 
to 100m. To make the environment realistic, a map of real city (Helsinki) was extracted for the 
study and map based movement was selected for simulation. The vehicles move towards 
randomly selected positions on the map. The details of simulations parameters are summarised 
in the table 6-2.
Parameter Value Range
Duration 12 Hours
Number of Nodes 250
Speed of Nodes 10 km/hr to 70 km/hr
Transmission Coverage 100 Meters
Mobility Model Map based Mobility
Message Size Variable
Message Generation Interval 25s -  35s
Routing Protocol Spray and Wait Protocol
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Number of Forwarding Copies 25 (10% of deployed nodes)
Table 6-4: Parameters for new CRL based Revocation Mechanism Simulation
Based on the parameters described above, certificate validation and revocation method was 
implemented on “Spray and Wait (SW)” binary mode routing protocol. The SW routing 
protocol is a deterministic and multi-copy protocol which achieves high delivery ratio while 
utilizes very low resources. In its working, the source starts by transmitting L copies to its 
neighbours. The receiver of these transmitted copies then forwards L/2 copies to the first node 
they encounter. Each of the nodes receiving a message copy of L/2 transmitted messages will 
forward the half of the number of total messages L to the node not having a copy of that 
message and which they will encounter. In this way the message will be delivered to the 
destination after repeated process of distributing message copies. So multiple copies of 
message relayed, in the network for delivering a single message to the destination, is 
considered message overhead in SW protocol [51]. Because, it is deterministic protocol and 
number of forwarding copies can be controlled which is why we have selected this for 
simulations. The revocation mechanism can be implemented on any other routing protocol for 
DTN as well.
For evaluation of revocation mechanism performance for selected scenario, we compared the 
simulation performance between X.509 based revocation mechanism and new CRL based 
revocation mechanism. For our selected scenario the system performance, when simulation 
was run for X.509 based CRL, is benchmark for results comparison. The network metrics 
selected for evaluation of system performance are given below:
•  Delivery Ratio = (M essages D elivered/ M essages Relayed),
• M essages Overhead Ratio = (M essages Relayed in network -  M essages Delivered 
to  destinations) /  M essages Delivered to  destinations,
•  Average Latency = Average (Time at M essages Delivered -  Time at M essages  
Created).
6.4.4.2.2 Impact o f CRL Size
To evaluate the practicability of new proposed revocation method, we examined the system 
performance under different traffic loads by varying CRL size. For this analysis, we fixed the 
number of deployed nodes to 250 for the selected city map. The SW routing protocol number 
of forwarding copies were 10% of total deployed nodes. In real world, usually a modem CA 
can issue a CRL of up to 150,000 revoked certificates in normal practice and for our analysis 
we have varied the CRL size consisted of number of revoked certificates from a low value of
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20,000 to a high value of 140,000. Figures 6-6, 6-7, 6-8 show the performance comparison 
between X.509 based CRL and new proposed CRL based revocation methods. At each 
intermediate node the signatures on X.509 certificate were validated and CA certificate was 
assumed to be valid. The network performance can be measured in terms of three traditional 
metrics defined above: successful delivery ratio, average latency and overhead ratio.
Figure 6-6 shows the relationship between delivery ratios and different CRL sizes. It is 
observed that successful delivery ratio degrades with increase in CRL size. The decrease in 
the delivery ratio is due to increase in traffic load a network can handle and computational 
processing to verify signatures and re-computing hashes. However, we can see that new CRL 
based revocation mechanism gives slightly better performance as compared to X.509 CRL 
based revocation method. The delivery ratio decrease faster as the traffic load increases above 
a specific threshold (for example after 60,000, 80,000 number of revoked certificates in figure 
6-6) and before that threshold there is a gradual decrease in the delivery ratio when number of 
revoked certificates are less than 60,000. This shows that delivery ratio is highest at some 
optimal number of revoked certificates (60,000 to 80,000) CRL is distributed and once number 
of number of revoked certificates increases that threshold the delivery ratio starts decreasing 
fast as traffic becomes higher than the optimal capacity of network system.
However, it can also be observed that security computation overhead and a bit high size of 
X.509 CRL degrades performance compared to new proposed CRL. The figure 6-6 clearly 
shows that when number of revoked certificates is low , the different between both schemes is 
very close. However, when CRL becomes very high, our proposed CRL gives better 
performance in terms of delivery ratio as compared to X.509 CRL.
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Figure 6-6: Impact of CRL Size: Delivery Ratio
Figure 6-7 demonstrates that X.509 CRL revocation mechanism has slightly larger overhead as 
compared to new proposed CRL based revocation mechanism. The overhead ratio for large 
CRL size is slightly more in the X.509 CRL based revocation mechanism as compared to new
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proposed CRL based revocation mechanism. However, the overhead in both revocation 
mechanisms are almost identical and slightly larger overhead in X.509 CRL based revocation 
mechanism.
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Figure 6-7: Impact of CRL Size: Overhead Ratio
From figure 6-8, it can be observed that average latency is increased while the CRL size in the 
network is increased. Here the average latency for X.509 CRL based revocation mechanism 
and new proposed CRL based revocation mechanism is not significantly different and the 
simulations have demonstrated similar performance in terms of average latency.
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Figure 6-8: Impact of CRL Size: Average Latency
In summary, we can say that above simulation results have demonstrated that new proposed 
CRL based revocation mechanism is indeed a viable and lightweight solution for distributing 
CRLs in DTN environment while remaining in compliance with bundle security architecture. 
The new proposed revocation mechanism gives slightly better performance as compared X.509 
CRL based revocation mechanism and besides that it remains in compliance with BSP 
specifications while X.509 based revocation mechanism will not be viable to work in
103
________________________ Chapter 6: A  Suitable Validation and Revocation Method fo r  DTN
compliance with BSP specifications due to the fact of verifying CA certificate via OCSP 
method.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, a new enhancement to standard PKI certificates revocation and validation 
mechanism is presented in detail along with its design and security and performance evaluation 
via simulations. The proposed method is efficient in terms of building CRL and searching 
through CRL as compared to original standard X.509 CRL. The proposed method also reduces 
CRL size as compared to X.509 CRL which has significant effect for larger CRL sizes as 
proven by simulations. The proposed scheme can be used as a certificate revocation and 
validation mechanism in DTN based networks.
The next chapter discusses the framework for DTN key management architecture.
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1 Framework for DTN Key Management 
Architecture
Key management for DTN is a very complex problem and still an open issue. The BSP 
defines the way to provide security services at hop-by-hop and end-to-end basis in compliance 
with the BP. However, it does not define how the keys, cipher suites and other necessary 
communication parameters, like security policies etc, will be negotiated with communicating 
parties. These parameters must be setup before BSP can function properly. This chapter 
defines a key management architecture and framework, based on our earlier work of ESKTS 
and new PKI validation and revocation mechanism, to address the above described issues.
7.1 Relationship between Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) and 
Proposed Key Management Architecture and Framework
This section describes the requirements for key management framework and its relationship 
with Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) drawn from DTN security literature [37 -  44, 52, 53].
The BSP provides end-to-end data confidentiality, data integrity and source authentication, 
hop-by-hop data integrity and source authentication, and access control in DTN networks. The 
security aware communicating parties need to define some shared state between them. The 
shared state defines the security services need to be provided to bundle, the cryptographic 
algorithms to use to provide security services and the keys used to implement those 
cryptographic mechanisms.
Establishing this shared state between communicating parties can be achieved manually but, it 
will not scale well. So we need a dynamic way to establish shared state and are still open issue. 
This section focuses on providing some analysis of shared state establishment from DTN 
literature and tries to draw some guideline towards solving this problem.
The key management architecture is considered a separate module which shall work together 
with BSP to provide a set of security services in DTN types of communication. As DTN runs 
as overlay network and supports a large community of different networks, so many different 
mechanisms might be used for different scenarios. It is advisable that the key management 
architecture should be independent of specific algorithms and should be flexible to incorporate
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any specific needs. Framework for DTN key management architecture relationship with the 
BSP is shown in figure 7-1.
Bundle Security Protocol
Bundle Authentication Block, 
Payload Integrity Block, , 
Payload Confidentiality Block
>
Provides
Shared Secret 
\ Keys, Cryptographic Suites)Security Policies
DTN Key Management 
Architecture
^EstablishesSetups
Figure 7-1: Relationship between proposed Key Management Architecture and Bundle Security
Protocol
Each part of the shared state establishment is a complex problem in its own and we discuss 
each matter separately in brief below.
The key management architecture should perform some authentication between un-trusted 
parties to develop some trust and establish a shared secret to build a secure channel between 
communicating parties. There needs to be deployed some new cryptographic mechanisms to 
achieve this functionality. The existing mechanisms like Deffie-Hellman exchange to establish 
a secure channel between untrusted parties and using some efficient authentication mechanism 
may be suitable considering very limited choices. But, Deffie-Hellman will not scale well as it 
only works end-to-end basis and each separate channel will be established between each two 
intermediate nodes.
Other public key mechanisms have been discussed for DTN like public key infrastructure 
(PKI), identity based cryptography (IDBC) key exchange mechanisms. But, both have been
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rejected by DTN community as they not follow the semantics of DTN design. In PKI the 
certificate validation requires large communication exchanges in order to validate the 
certificate and similarly in IDBC, identity verification also requires lot of communication 
exchanges to validate the identity of the user and do not scale very well. However, some 
communication efficient, distributed validation mechanism can make PKI work for DTN
After the secure channel is established between communicating parties, the level of security 
services and cryptographic algorithms can be negotiated for later secure communication. The 
BSP defines some cryptographic suites as default in BSP however, there may be new 
mechanisms existing later on. So, initiator can send the available options to receiver in a secure 
way, and the receiver can opt out a mechanism from available choices.
In order to perform security operations, BSP also requires the security policies to be setup at 
each node. BSP enables each communicating node to enforce security policies. So, security 
policy is also required to be setup at nodes for proper functioning of BSP.
Except the shared state establishment, the communicating parties may need to perform some
I
exchanges of control messages for different purposes. However, it is advisable that these all 
negotiations should happen after the secure and authentic channel is established between 
communicating parties.
The different mechanisms, to be defined for shared state establishment, need to be in 
accordance with DTN design semantics. The schemes should address the DTN challenges 
including high rate of bundle loss and variable delays in communication.
7.2 New Framework for DTN Key Management Architecture
The new key management architecture and framework provides a way to build a shared state 
by establishing a secure channel between communicating parties by exchanging keys and 
negotiating cipher suites to use for communication. It also helps the communicating nodes to 
setup their security policy information dependent upon shared secret state. A way to notify 
about certain events or to send error messages between communicating parties is also defined 
in the new key management architecture and framework. All the components of key 
management framework and how they work together are shown in figure 7-2. This section 
describes in detail the new key management architecture and framework defined for DTN.
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Figure 7-2: Key Management Architecture and Framework: Components and their working
7.2.1 Establishing Shared Secret
7.2.1.1 Exchanging Keying Material
A secure channel is a way to transfer data between communicating parties which is resistant to 
interception and tampering. The secure channel achieves confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication between communicating parties. A secure channel is termed as “Security 
Association (SA)” and this is always directional from source A to destination B as path may
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vary in each direction. To establish secure channel between communicating parties in both 
ways, two SA will be established in each direction.
To establish a SA between communicating parties in two directions, ESKTS should be run in 
both ways (see chapter 5 for details about ESKTS). ESKTS will enable both communicating 
parties to generate the symmetric keys at their ends and transfer them to other communicating 
in a secure way on an unsecure channel. As ESKTS is based on public key cryptography, the 
certificate of communicating parties will be required to be validated for revocation which can 
be checked from the CRL distributed via new Certificate revocation and validation 
mechanism. New heap based CRL certificates revocation mechanism is proposed in chapter 6 
to provide a suitable mechanism for DTN based networks.
At this point in secure channel establishment, each party would have generated symmetric key 
for cryptographic operations like confidentiality and authentication and all keys are delivered 
securely to other parties. The communicating parties can prefer to use different keys for each 
of security operation like confidentiality and authentication or can use same key for all security 
operations depending upon their security requirements. The symmetric keys negotiated can 
help only for end-to-end integrity, authentication and confidentiality operations. As, DTN 
requires hop-by-hop integrity and authentication, the same proxy signatures will be used for all 
secure communication even symmetric keys have been established between end parties.
A separate long life key can also be negotiated in the start which can be used for rekeying of 
symmetric keys for later on communication. It is totally dependent upon the security and 
communication requirements of the communication system and is purely deployment decision. 
The key management architecture and framework can properly work for exchanging new keys 
each time rekeying is required.
All the payloads in secure channel establishment communication will be encapsulated 
according to BP and BSP rules (more details are available in chapter 5).
7.2.1.2 Negotiating Cipher suites between communicating Parties
Cipher suites can be negotiated at the time of exchanging keys and building secure channel via 
ESKTS. There are 4 mandatory cipher suites defined for BSP and there is a support to define 
any custom cipher suites in BSP. The information about cipher suite to be used can be 
embedded in the ESKTS payload message according to BSP specifications.
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7.2.1.3 Security Policy Setup
Security policy is an enforcement point for every node to process messages securely. The 
security policy can be distributed by many different roles in the network e.g. policy 
distribution server etc, but we only focus here to distribute the security policy from source to 
destination in a unicast communication. The details about how the security policy is defined 
are out of scope of this document. However the defined policy can be encrypted and 
encapsulated in the bundle blocks according to BP and BSP rules.
The security policy defines many parameters, for example, forwarding conditions; under what 
conditions the BAB supplied information should be considered enough for authentication etc. 
As security policy is meant for end-to-end communication, the security policy defined and 
encapsulated in bundle format can be encrypted by the generated symmetric key at the source 
end and can be securely transmitted to the destination along with other keying material 
information in ESKTS message exchange or can be transmitted separately once a secure 
channel is established.
7.2.2 Informational Exchanges
As DTN networks have characteristics for high delays and high disruptions, there are large 
chances that bundles sent can be lost. So, there is a big requirement that peers may desire to 
convey some control or error information e.g. notifications or configuration scripts etc. To 
accomplish this. Key management architecture and framework defines a support to send these 
informational messages. These informational exchanges can only happen after establishment 
of secure channel. Once symmetric keys are established between communicating parties, the 
informational payload can be encrypted by using the symmetric key and can be sent to 
destination via secure channel. However, how the informational exchanges are defined is out 
of the scope of this document as all control information signals and configuration scripts are 
not yet finalised by DTN community.
7.3 Summary
This chapter has defined a new key management architecture and framework to enable secure, 
practical deployment of DTN networks. The new key management architecture and framework 
provides a way to build a shared state by establishing a secure channel between 
communicating parties by exchanging keys and negotiating cipher suites to use for 
communication by using earlier proposed methods of ESKTS and new heap based CRL 
revocation methods. It also helps the communicating nodes to setup their security policy
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information while exchanging the keys by encrypting information with secret key. A way to 
notify about certain events or to send error messages between communicating parties is also 
defined in the new key management architecture and framework.
In the next chapter, we conclude our thesis and set the guidelines for future work.
I l l
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8 Conclusions
In this final chapter, we will highlight the conclusion of the work presented in this thesis, and 
list a few directions for possible future improvement and new research areas.
8.1 Main Findings
This thesis represented a research on “Security in Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks”. Over 
the past few years, networks with characteristics of long delays, high disruptions, asymmetric 
data rates and/or low delivery ratio etc, have gained popularity. Different approaches have 
been researched in the past to improve performance of networks under these challenged 
conditions e.g. modifying TCP behaviour suitable for a selected set of networks including 
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) based satellite networks and by proposing complete 
new networking architecture such as Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN).
The presence of PEPs on satellite links has disadvantages, e.g. splitting the TCP connection is 
not compliant with standard internet security mechanism IPsec as IPsec encrypts the traffic 
which can be only viewed at end nodes only. A new dynamic ML-IPsec protocol is discussed 
as a solution for TCP/IP based challenged networks. The ML-IPsec can solve the interworking 
issues between intermediate devices such as PEPs and IPsec. The new dynamic ML-IPsec can 
be applied to a vast domain of applications by making application more flexible to break IP 
datagram into different zones. It also provides the support to break down IP datagram up to 15 
levels while degrading the performance of the system to some extent. The proposed method 
also improves the efficiency and reduces complexity to encapsulate the zones information into 
ESP payload. Some results of our analysis relating to security policy enforcement and network 
performance evaluation with different network bandwidth and traffic load are shown. It is 
observed that dynamic ML-IPsec gives almost same performance as IPsec performs when 
network bandwidth is more than 3 Mbps. However, when network bandwidth is low, then 
there is small performance reduction as compared to IPsec.
The other paradigm. Delay and Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN), is an overlay 
networking architecture; evolved from a focus on deep space networks to a broader class of 
heterogeneous networks e.g. wireless adhoc networks, wireless local area networks etc. Lots of 
efforts have been made to solve the networking issues in DTN, yet a little attention has been 
paid to the security in DTN. Key Management in DTN is still considered to be an open issue.
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A new ESKTS scheme provides a way to transport the symmetric key using public key 
cryptography. The symmetric key generated at a DTN node can be transported to other 
communicating body securely along with the data. The ESKTS is scalable, communication 
efficient and compliant with Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) semantics. It is observed via 
simulations that when network size is changed, the performance of ESKTS in presence of 
security is very close to SW performance without security. However, there is a 9.75% 
performance degradation in ESKTS with DSA security compared to SW without security 
performance in very densely deployed network configuration. This behaviour is almost the 
same as the behaviour observed in the traffic load analysis when the number of forwarding 
copies of SW routing protocol is increased. The performance degradation in optimal 
configurations of number of forwarding copies scenario was 5% and when all optimal 
configurations for different network sizes is simulated, the performance degradation has 
increased to 10% for very densely deployed networks. In summary, we can say that the 
simulation results have demonstrated that ESKTS is indeed a viable and lightweight solution 
for transporting the symmetric keys securely in DTN environment.
Standard PKI validation and revocation mechanism is enhanced by a new scheme, which 
enables the applications to build Certificate Revocation List (CRL) of reduced size. 
Furthermore it also increases the efficiency to search through the list while providing 
communication efficiency to distribute in the network due to its reduced size. It is observed via 
simulations that successful delivery ratio degrades with increase in CRL size. The decrease in 
the delivery ratio is due to the increase in traffic load a network can handle and computational 
processing to verify signatures and re-computing hashes. However, we can see that new CRL 
based revocation mechanism gives slightly better performance as compared to X.509 CRL 
based revocation method. The delivery ratio decreases more rapidly as the traffic load 
increases beyond a specific threshold (60,000, 80,000 number of revoked certificates) and 
before that threshold there is a gradual decrease in the delivery ratio when number of revoked 
certificates are less than 60,000. In summary, we can say that above simulation results have 
demonstrated that new proposed CRL based revocation mechanism is indeed a viable and 
lightweight solution for distributing CRLs in DTN environment while remaining in 
compliance with bundle security architecture. The new proposed revocation mechanism gives 
slightly better performance as compared X.509 CRL based revocation mechanism and besides 
that it remains in compliance with BSP specifications while X.509 based revocation 
mechanism will not be viable to work in compliance with BSP specifications due to the fact of 
verifying CA certificate via OCSP method.
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New key management architecture is proposed to establish a shared state between 
communicating parties dynamically. The shared state defines the security services; the 
cryptographic algorithms and the keys. The new key management architecture and framework 
provides a way to build a shared state by establishing a secure channel between 
communicating parties by exchanging keys and negotiating cipher suites to use for 
communication. It also helps the communicating nodes to setup their security policy 
information dependent upon a shared secret state. A way to notify about certain events or to 
send error messages between communicating parties is also defined in the new key 
management architecture and framework.
8.2 Future Work
In this thesis, we have proposed a key management solution for DTN networks and a dynamic 
ML-IPSec protocol for TCP/IP PEPs based satellite networks. These are challenging tasks and 
we believe that our work can be carried further in the following directions:
A distributed key management mechanism should be investigated to enable ML-IPSec CSA to 
function properly. ML-IPSec protocol can be implemented on a real OS, like Linux, Windows 
etc, and its performance can be analysed with a variety of different applications. It will also be 
interesting to see the behaviour of ML-IPSec when broken into large number of zones for 
different application requirements to see the practical implications of ML-IPSec 
implementation.
In terms of key management for DTN, it will be interesting to provide some key agreement 
protocol once a secure channel is established using ESKTS. The work on key management can 
also be enhanced be defining the detailed design of security policy and Informational 
exchanges (error messages and configuration messages). To define the detailed key 
management architecture including the header design of security policies exchanges, 
informational exchanges will be an interesting problem for future research.
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Appendix A: Important Simulation Code
Code for Measuring Execution Time for Cryptographic Overhead
The code was written in Java programming language and the following code can be executed 
by rewriting the code according to provided snapshots where appropriate. The copy of code 
can also be provided on request. Please send email at m.bhutta@surrev.ac.uk to request a copy 
of code.
This appendix section assumes that the reader is familiar with Java programming and also has 
understanding of Java Cryptography Library (JCL). The diagrams below show the pieces of 
code which can be used as guidelines to build Java programs for Security overhead execution 
time calculation.
P  CryptogiephicOv<tifead
£tiif ü r a g s t t  £*urct RefjdW: g«it: g esug  Profile TwtQ loo ls  # r x k w  Help
4-
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# 1  2 S | i  ;m s
Figure OA-1: Definition of main Java method for Overhead Calculation program
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Figure OA-2: Java program code to compute execution time to calculate Hash values
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Figure OA-3: Java program code to compute execution time to sign and verify digital signatures
using RSA
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Figure OA-4: Java program code to compute execution time to sign and verify digital signatures
using DSA
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Figure OA-5: Java program code to compute execution time to encrypt and decrypt data using
DSA
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Figure OA-6: Java program code to compute execution time to encrypt using AES-ECB
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Figure OA-7: Java program code to compute execution time to decrypt using AES-ECB
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Code for Adding Application to ONE Simulator like ESKTS or CRL
This appendix section assumes that the reader is familiar with Java programming and also has 
good understanding of ONE simulator. The diagrams below show the pieces of code which can 
be used as guidelines to build applications in ONE simulator. To get complete code please 
send email to m.bhutta@surrev.ac.uk.
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Figure OA-8: Java program code to define Application class
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Figure OA-10: Java program code for Application Constructor deHnition and setting simulation
parameters of simulation conHguration files
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Figure OA-11: Java program code for Application Constructor definition and setting simulation
parameters from the object of application
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Figure OA-12: Java program code to show method for implementation of functionality of
Intermediate Nodes and Destination
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Figure OA-13: Java program code to show method for implementation of functionality of Source
Nodes
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